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The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal
Oversight of Derivatives Transactions
in the United States
Charles A. Samuelson*
Introduction
In one month, Nicholas W. Leeson, a Singapore-based trader for Barings
plc, risked $29 billion speculating on the price of Japanese stocks and
bonds by purchasing financial products called derivatives.' Leeson disap-
peared from Singapore on February 23, 1995.2 By the end of the following
day, the 227 year-old bank did not have enough assets to meet its short-
term obligations.3 When Leeson appeared in Germany on Thursday,
March 2, 1995, the firm's losses were over $1 billion.4 Barings' collapse
was not the first event to provoke calls for increased oversight of deriva-
tives, 5 but Barings did not fail because Leeson bought derivatives. Barings
failed because its managers were incompetent6 and did not properly over-
see the activities of the young trader. 7 The only parties Barings injured
thrQugh its use of derivatives were Leeson (who pled guilty to cheating the
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1996; B.A., Williams College, 1990.
1. Richard W. Stevenson, The Collapse of Barings: The Overview, Young Traders' $29
Billion Bet Brings Down a Venerable Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at Al. See generally
BANK OF ENGLAND, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY INTO THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS cH 1.33-1.70 (1995).
2. Stevenson, supra note 1.
3. Richard W. Stevenson, Breaking the Bank-A Special Report: Big Gambles, Lost
Bets Sank a Venerable Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at Al.
4. British Trader Whose Big Losses Ruined Bank Is Held in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1995, at Al (reporting losses on March 2, 1995 "in excess" of $1 billion).
5. In April 1994, Proctor & Gamble Co. announced that it would take a one-time
pre-tax charge of $157 million against losses incurred in two derivatives trades. Barbara
D. Granito, Portfolio Poker: Just What Firms Do With 'Derivatives' Is Suddenly a Hot Issue,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994, at Al. J.P Morgan & Co. lost $50 million on interest-only
mortgage derivatives in early 1992; Salomon Inc. lost $250 million in mortgage deriva-
tives in 1993, and Showa Sekiyu K.K, ajapanese oil company, admitted to losing $1.59
billion from trading currency derivatives, also in 1993. Barbara D. Granito & Craig
Torres, Portfolio Surprise: Many Americans Run Hidden Financial Risk from 'Derivatives',
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at Al. In 1994, Piper Jaffray, a mutual funds manager,
reported pre-tax losses of $700 million from derivatives trades. John Greenwald, The
Devil's in the Derivatives, TIME, Oct. 10, 1994, at 54. George Soros, an international
financier, is said to have lost $600 million in a few days from adverse market movements
against investments in certain derivatives products. Tim W. Ferguson, Business World:
Taking Chances Before Congress, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at A21; Roger Fillion, Con-
gress Looks Closely at Hedge Funds, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, financial section, at 8.
6. See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, I 2.41, 2.45 ("It may well be that I
agreed to bite off more than I could chew .. "), 2.47, 2.54.
7. Id.
29 CotNELL INT'L I.J. 767 (1996)
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Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and Coopers &
Lybrand),8 Barings' managers (who lost their jobs), Barings' shareholders
(who lost their investment), 9 and several other creditors of Barings (who
also lost their money). 10 In short, Barings' insolvency harmed only parties
that either expressly or implicitly assumed the risks that arise when private
parties enter into derivatives transactions.
The forces that give rise to derivatives transactions are evidence of a
well-functioning market. Parties to a derivatives transaction, such as Bar-
ings, face four different risks-market risk, legal risk, credit risk, and opera-
tions risk" Those who enter derivatives transactions must recognize and
deal with these risks. This Note discusses how effectively current legal
rules reduce transaction costs of parties to derivatives transactions by pro-
moting certainty and providing information and proper risk allocation to
market participants. 12 It compares the laws that applied in Barings' col-
lapse to laws that apply to similar U.S. transactions.' 3 Part I of the Note
describes the events that gave rise to Barings' fall. Part II describes the
international financial environment in which this failure took place. Part
III analyzes the legal tools different nations have designed to lower transac-
tion costs for parties who use derivatives. Part IV discusses the lessons of
Barings' collapse. The Note concludes that governments should regulate
the use of derivatives only to reduce transaction costs or mitigate negative
externalities.14
I. The Road to Insolvency
In 1767,15 Francis Baring ignored his mother's advice not to enter the
8. Jeremy Mark, Leeson Pleads Guilty to Two Charges in Barings Collapse, and May
Cooperate, WAL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1995, at A2.
9. For a description of Barings' shareholders, see text accompanying infra note 21.
10. Alternatively, one could argue that Barings' collapse was not due to Leeson's use
of derivatives but was instead a manifestation of the "rogue trader" phenomenon in
which a renegade employee is able to hide huge losses from a company's managers and
regulatory overseers by manipulating accounting systems. Cf. Laurie P. Cohen, Daiwa
Bank Reportedly Hid News of Trading Loss from its Lawyers, WALL ST.J., Oct. 26, 1995, at
Bl (describing the "rogue trader," but not in relation to the Barings' collapse). Though
Leeson may certainly be categorized as a "rogue trader" Barings' insolvency resulted
from the use of leverage in derivatives transactions. See infra Part II.B.3. This Note does
not discuss ways to curtail rogue traders per se, but rather discusses the many different
risks inherent in derivatives transactions of which rogue trading is but one.
11. See infra Part II.C.1.
12. See infra Part III.
13. For example, bankruptcy laws may help a third-party bank that lends money to a
counter-party in a derivatives transaction to assess the risk of the counter-party's bank-
ruptcy. See infra Part IIIA.2.
14. Barings' insolvency was not large enough to cause any loss to third parties. See
infra Part II.C.2.
15. Richard W. Stevenson, Markets Shaken as a British Bank Takes a Big Loss, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al; Floyd Norris, Financiers With a Real Place in History, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at D5.
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banking business. 16 In the years that followed, Baring's bank became a
huge success, helping to finance Britain's involvement in the Revolutionary
War and the United States' Louisiana Purchase. 17 In recent years, the bank
staked out a position in emerging, volatile markets, including Latin
America and Asia. 18 It was not until 227 years after the bank's founding
that the Barings family wished that Francis had followed his mum's advice.
A. Barings' Organization
Like many multinational investment banks, the organization known as
"Barings" was a complex web of subsidiaries organized as separate entities
under the laws of various countries.19 At the time of its collapse, Barings
plc, a holding company, controlled the operations of the successor to the
partnership that Francis Baring had organized.20 The executive manage-
ment held Barings plc's voting share capital (common stock). The Baring
Foundation, a U.K.-registered charity, owned the non-voting share capi-
tal.21 Barings plc owned Baring Brothers & Co., Ltd. (BB&Co), an
"authorized" bank22 based in London with branches in Singapore and
Hong Kong.23 In 1984, BB&Co acquired the entity that became known as
Barings Securities Ltd. (BSL) from Henderson Crotiwaite, which operated
as a broker-dealer through subsidiaries in the Pacific, Latin America, New
York, and London.24 BSL conducted stock brokerage activities out of
London and was incorporated in the Cayman Islands.25
BSL had several overseas operating subsidiaries, including two in Sin-
gapore: Barings Securities (Singapore) Pte Ltd. (BSS), which principally
engaged in securities trading, and Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd.
(BFS), which BSL formed to allow Barings to trade on SIMEX.26 Barings
Securities (Japan) Ltd. (BSJ) was the BSL subsidiary that conducted Bar-
16. Peter Martin, When New into Old Won't Go: An Attempt to Combine Old-Style
Banking with a Freewheeling Securities Business Sealed Barings' Fate, FIN. Trmis, Mar. 4,
1995, at 8. In a letter, she warned him,
I see you have begun in the Exchange way... [I] advise you to be careful you do
not run out of your depth. I am satisfied 'tis attended with risk, and many
houses called considerable abroad have often disappointed and sometimes abso-
lutely ruined those who have placed Confidence in them.
Id.
17. Stevenson, supra note 15; Norris, supra note 15. "We all tremble about the mag-
nitude of the loan," said a Barings executive at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. Id.
18. Stevenson, supra note 15.
19. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, I 2.4-2.26.
20. Id. T 1.1, 1.18. Throughout this Note, "Barings" refers to the operations of
Barings plc and its operating subsidiaries.
21. Id. cl 1.19.
22. Id. q 1.24. An "authorized" bank is one to whom the Bank of England has given
regulatory approval to accept deposits. Cf. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22 § 8(1) (Eng.).
BB&Co was responsible for the consolidated supervision of Barings. BANK OF ENGLAND,
supra note 1, q 1.24.
23. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, q1 1.21.
24. Id. cl 1.20.
25. Id. qI 1.22, 2.4.
26. Id. cI9I 1.22, 1.33.
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ings' agency and proprietary trading in Japan.27 Figure 1 provides a dia-
gram of Barings plc's relevant operating subsidiaries.
Barings plcI




Barings Securities Barings Futures Barings Securities
(Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) Pte Ltd. (Japan) Ltd.
(BSS) (BFS) (BSJ)
Figure 1
Barings PLC and its Relevant Operating Subsidiaries
Before 1992, Barings plc ran its banking and broker-dealer businesses
separately, to the point of occupying different London offices. 28 Only
Andrew Tuckey, Deputy Chairman of Barings plc, was a member of both
the BB&Co and BSL boards of directors. 29 By the end of 1992, Tuckey and
Peter Baring, the Chairman of Barings plc, decided to merge the operations
of BB&Co and BSL into a single business unit.30 In 1993, the Board of
Directors of Barings plc established a new organization, Barings Invest-
ment Bank (BIB), that combined the stock brokerage operations of BSL
with the investment banking activities of BB&Co.31 BIB was organized
with a "matrix" reporting structure, in which a product supervisor and an
administrative supervisor oversaw different activities (e.g., trading). 32 As
with most such reporting schemes, product oversight could take place from
anywhere in the world while administrative oversight typically occurred at
the locus of the particular activity.33 It was precisely this joint responsibil-
ity for overseeing Leeson that allowed him to conceal his activities for an
extended period of time.34
27. Id. 1 3.20.
28. Id. '1 2.5.
29. Id. 'I'I 1.31, 2.5.
30. Id. 2.20.
31. Id. 1 2.20.
32. Id. 2.22.
33. See, e.g., infra notes 41, 47 and accompanying text (describing Leeson's dual
roles).
34. See, e.g., infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
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B. Barings' Operations
Barings engaged in a number of different activities, including investment
banking, agency trading (trading for clients), and proprietary trading (trad-
ing for Barings' own account).35 Since mid-1992, BFS had executed finan-
cial futures contract trades on SIMEX and the Osaka Exchange: Nikkei 225
contracts, Japanese Government Bond contracts, three-month Euroyen con-
tracts, and options related to those futures.36 Although BFS originally exe-
cuted trades only on behalf of its clients, by mid-1993 BFS had begun to
trade on its own account by taking advantage of price differences between
financial products on SIMEX and the Osaka Exchange, a type of arbitrage
activity known as "switching."37
Leeson began working for Barings in 1989.38 In March 1992, Barings
transferred Leeson from London to Singapore.39 After passing local
exams, he began trading on SIMEX and, by 1993, was general manager of
BFS.40 As general manager of BFS, Leeson performed two types of activi-
ties for Barings: he managed Barings' proprietary switching business as
well as the back office that reconciled proprietary and client trading.
41
Leeson's dual responsibilities prevented the back office reconciliation pro-
cess from serving as an oversight mechanism to Leeson's own activities.
In executing trades for Barings, Leeson was supposed to take advan-
tage of price differences in identical financial instruments-futures con-
tracts on Japanese stocks and bonds42 -on SIMEX and the Osaka
Exchange43 by buying in the market with the lower price, and then imme-
diately selling in the other market.44 The small spread in price between
the two markets necessitated large purchases and sales for Barings to make
significant profits. 45 Because the buying and selling occurred simultane-
ously, such transactions were relatively low-risk.46
In addition to Leeson's dual trading and managerial roles,47 Barings
35. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, cl 3.18.
36. Id. l 1.37.
37. Id. 1.38.
38. Id. '1 2.56.
39. Id. 2.58.
40. Id. 2.58, 2.60.
41. Id. 'ic 7.10, 7.14.
42. Id. c1c 3.18, 3.26-3.40. 4.1. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
43. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, TI 3.1-3.74.
44. Stevenson, supra note 3. These transactions are called arbitrage. See CAROLYN R.
GI'SON, THE McGRAw HILL DICToNARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANcE 44 (1994).
Most of the arbitrage in which Leeson engaged was based on the Nikkei Index. Steven-
son, supra note 3. The Nikkei Index is the stock price index for the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. GIPSON, supra, at 267, 373.
45. Stevenson, supra note 3.
46. Richard W. Stevenson, A Rise and Fall and a Birthday in Hiding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1995, at D5. Because the transactions were supposed to be simultaneous, Leeson was
not supposed to leave Barings with any open positions. Id.
47. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 1I 7.10, 7.14. See also Richard W. Stevenson,
Barings Knew of Big Gamble, Officials Assert, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 5, 1995, at 1.
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placed no limits on his trading operations in Singapore.48 This was an
unusual practice in the industry.49 On March 25, 1992,James Bax, head of
Barings Singapore office, wrote a letter to Andrew Fraser, head of Barings'
brokerage and trading group in London, suggesting that Leeson not be
allowed to report directly to London but, instead, report to Simon Jones,
director of Barings' Singapore office.50 In the summer of 1994, an internal
audit at Barings reported that Leeson had an "excessive concentration of
power" that could lead to "error and fraud."
51
In early July of 1992, Leeson opened account 88888, which he desig-
nated a "client" account, and which BFS's accounting system recognized as
an error account.' 2 From July 1, 1992, to December 31, 1994, account
88888 built up a loss of £208 million. Leeson had apparently hidden the
losses from certain authorized proprietary trades made on Barings' behalf
in "client" account 88888.5
3
By January of 1995, Leeson began to make increasingly larger trading
bets in an attempt to recover these earlier losses.' 4 Although the exact
sequence of events is still unclear,"5 Leeson lost more money with the fall
in the Japanese stock market following the Kobe earthquake onJanuary 17,
48. John Gapper & Nicholas Denton, The Barings Crisis: Leeson Had No Overall
Trade Limits in Summer, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 1995, at 2.
49. Stevenson, supra note 47.
50. Id. ("My concern is that once again we are in danger of setting up a structure
which will subsequently prove to be disastrous and with which we will succeed in losing
either a lot of money or client good will or probably both."); Broken Bank: Barings PLC
Officials May Have Been Aware of Trader's Position, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at Al.
51. Stevenson, supra note 47. The auditor also said that there were "no gross limits
set for arbitrage positions" and that "[t]he only constrain[t] is that group treasury will
eventually inform Barings Futures that they will cease funding requirements if they grow
too large." Gapper & Denton, supra note 48.
52. BANK OF ENGLM, supra note 1, 1 4.5. Exchange members use an error account
to reconcile differences that arise in the course of trading on behalf of clients. Id.
53. Id. I 3.34, 3.73, 4.3, 4.18, 4.22, 4.28.
54. Stevenson, supra note 15, at D5; Kurt Eichenwald, The Collapse of Barings: Men
Who Shook the Foundations, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1995, at D8 (discussing recent trading
losses incurred at a variety of organizations, including Orange County California (by
Robert L. Citron in 1994), Chemical Bank (by Victor Gomez in 1994), Kidder Peabody
& Company (by Joseph Jett in 1994), Salomon Brothers (by Paul Mozer in 1991), and
Merrill Lynch (by Howard Rubin in 1987); Richard W. Stevenson, Breaking the Bank-A
Special Report: Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at
Al (describing Leeson's motivation for making the trades as uncertain and stating that
many people assume Leeson was trying to recover earlier trading losses).
For a more in-depth account of Leeson's unauthorized activities, see BANK OF ENG
LAND, supra note 1, TIcl 3.1-3.72.
55. Leeson had sold the Nikkei Index long (Le., bet that the Nikkei Index would
increase), sold Japanese government debt short (i.e., bet that interest rates would rise),
and had sold straddles involving the Nikkei Index (i.e., bet that the Index would trade
within a narrow range). It does not seem that the long and short sales were consistent
with the straddles. See Anant K Sundaram, Letter, The Long and Short of Nicky's Strat-
egy, WAn ST. J., Mar. 14, 1995, at A15. One explanation, which seems to make the most
sense, is that Leeson had originally engaged only in the futures sales and started selling
straddles to raise money to meet increasing margin calls. See Richard W. Stevenson,
Barings Officials Optimistic on Finding a Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at Dl.
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1995.56 Leeson ultimately purchased $7 billion in Japanese stock market
forwards,57 $22 billion in futures on Japanese government bonds and cur-
rency investments,58 and $3.8 billion in straddles on the Nikkei Index.59
On February 27, 1995, account 88888 showed losses of £827 million.
When the markets dosed on February 28, 1995, Barings' net loss stood at
just over $1 billion.60 Within two weeks, Internationale Nederlanden
Groep N.V. (ING) agreed to acquire Barings in exchange for ING's promise
to pay off all depositors and creditors.61 ING assumed liabilities of $1.39
billion to SIMEX, the Osaka Stock Exchange, and Japanese banks that had
extended credit to Barings.
62
II. Background
Three factors characterize the world of Barings' collapse: the use of bureau-
cratic organizational structures to oversee derivatives transactions; the
potential for great benefits accruing to parties entering into derivatives
transactions; and the particular risks to parties entering derivatives
transactions.
A. Managerial Oversight Structure
Both government regulators and the organizations they oversee use bureau-
cracies to mobilize resources and accomplish day-to-day tasks. Despite the
widespread use of bureaucracies, they are notoriously inefficient. Under-
standing why bureaucracies are inefficient is vital to understanding how
Barings' managers and regulators were unable to detect Leeson's activities
over such a long period of time.
56. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, l 4.4; concerning the earthquake, see generally
Nicholas D. Kristof, Quake in Japan: The Overview, at Least 597 Are Killed in Japanese
Quake, Kobe Devastated as 2000 Buildings Buckle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al.
57. Stevenson, supra note 1; Saul Hansell, The Collapse of Barings: For Rogue Traders,
Yet Another Victim, N.Y. Tmis, Feb. 28, 1995, at DI; Stevenson, supra note 3.
58. Stevenson, supra note 1; Hansell, supra note 57; Stevenson, supra note 3.
59. Sheryl WuDunn, Osaka, a Venue for Making Big Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at
D6. Traders estimate Leeson was short 40,000 straddles (20,000 puts and 20,000 calls)
with a strike price ofY19,000. Id. On January 23, 1995, the Nikkei Index fell to Y17,
785.49. Stevenson, supra note 3. On March 2, 1995 the Nikkei Index was at Y16,
618.71. WuDunn, supra. Recent accounts of Barings' losses do not make clear if the
$3.8 billion in straddles was part of the $7 billion position in the Japanese stock market.
60. Stevenson, supra note 1. Because some of Barings' losses will be covered by the
amounts in margin accounts and because market prices continue to fluctuate, the total
value of Barings' unsecured losses will be difficult to value. As of Tuesday, February 28,
1995, Barings had futures contracts with an outstanding value of about $3 billion at the
Osaka Stock Exchange and $330 million on deposit to cover margin calls. WuDunn,
supra note 59. Officials in Osaka expected the $330 million to be enough to cover Bar-
ings' losses on that exchange. Id.
61. Richard W. Stevenson, New Barings Owner Retains the Firm's Top Executives, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at D1 (reporting that Barings bondholders, vith claims of $162
billion, would receive 5% of their claims up-front and up to an additional 20% later on).
62. Id. (reporting that Barings owed $259 million to SIMEX, $145 million to the
Osaka Stock Exchange, and $988 million to banks in Japan). Barings lost £927 million
after liquidation. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 1 4.14.
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One characteristic of a well-run bureaucracy is a division of labor
between different organizational units. Such a division of labor allows a
firm's managers and employees to specialize and develop expertise that a
firm can use in the efficient development of its human and real capital
resources.6 3 The rise of corporate management of business undertakings
has been linked to the efficiency inherent in the corporate form.64 But
such efficiency comes at a cost. The scope and nature of a large organiza-
tion's activities make effective oversight extremely difficult.6 5 Some form
of middle management can help a large organization to oversee its activi-
ties,66 but the existence of middle management does not by itself produce
a well-monitored organization.
Like most modem corporations, Barings was organized to delegate
authority to different specialists and geographic units. 67 Barings gave
Leeson the authority to engage in certain trades likely to benefit the firm.
6 8
In theory, managers in Barings' Singapore and London offices were sup-
posed to oversee his activities.69 There were several levels of management
between Leeson and Peter Barings, the Chairman of the Board, on February
23, 1995.70 Most studies of the derivatives market have recognized the
importance of separating trading and clearing functions, 7 1 but Barings
gave Leeson responsibility for both trading and clearing.
7 2
Why did Barings allow this conflict to exist? One explanation for Bar-
ings' failure is managerial-Barings' failure resulted from poor manage-
ment. Just days after Barings' collapse, some commentators had already
attributed Barings' collapse to an organizational structure that had Leeson
reporting to more than one person, and which consequently did not allow
63. Because of the limits of time and resources, one person cannot become a special-
ist in all things. An organization of several specialists can possess a range of expertise to
bring to bear on different problems. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MAAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMER cAN BusI.SS 6-7 (1977). The economic
explanation for the managerial organization is that managerial organizations develop
where the transaction costs associated with performing an activity within the organiza-
tion are less than the transaction costs associated with setting up multiple contracts
between organizations. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMIcA 386, 395
(1937).
64. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 1.1 (1986); CHANDLER, supra note
63; Coase, supra note 63.
65. Chandler argues that middle management developed to perform the oversight
function. CHANDLER, supra note 63, at 7. At some point a tension develops between
oversight and efficiency. This point occurs when oversight becomes intrusive and stops
people from effectively performing their jobs. See, e.g., TOM PETERS, THRIVING ON CHAOS
16-17 (1987).
66. CHANDLER, supra note 63, at 7.
67. See supra Figure 1.
68. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
70. See supra Figure 1.
71. Sheila C. Bair, Remarks, Lessons From the Barings Collapse, 64 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1,
5 (1995) (citing COMMODITY FUURES TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETrS
AN THEIR REGULATION 134 (1993); GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES PRACTIcEs AND PRINCI.
PLs 12-13, 15-16 (1993); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, infra note 75).
72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Leeson's superiors to effectively oversee the different aspects of Leeson's
job.73 Additionally, it is not clear how Barings' management could allow
Leeson to perform jobs with conflicting responsibilities after the conflict
had been identified.
74
However, poor organizational structure, incompetent management,
and Barings' employees lack of respect for internal controls do not entirely
explain Barings' failure. Barings' regulators, also part of a bureaucracy,
failed to detect or prevent Leeson's unauthorized trades. This suggests that
weaknesses inherent to bureaucracy allowed Leeson to cause Barings'
collapse.
B. Benefits of Using Derivatives
Despite the attendant risk of derivatives, countries allow parties such as
Barings to enter them because, in part, such transactions provide real bene-
fits to the parties and the countries that engage in them. A derivative is an
asset whose value is based on (derived from), the value of an underlying
asset.7 ' This Section of the Note describes Leeson's transactions and pro-
vides a brief overview of the reasons why parties generally enter derivatives
transactions.
1. Description of the Derivatives That Destroyed Barings
There are generally four types of derivatives: options, swaps, forwards, and
futures. 76 A call option is a contract to buy an asset in the future.77 A put
option is a contract to sell an asset in the future. 78 A swap is an agreement
between parties to exchange cash flows over a specified period of time.
79
The purchaser of a forward contract promises to buy a specified asset on a
specific date at a known price.80 The terms of a forward contract are spe-
cifically negotiated, while a futures contract is purchased on an exchange,
73. See, e.g., John Gapper, The Barings Crisis: Tough Questions for Supervisors-Bank
of England, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 1995, at 2 (identifying Barings management system as a
"matrix" form of management). It is not yet clear if Barings used a true matrix manage-
ment system, which in certain cases is an effective form of managerial oversight. Techni-
cally, Leeson reported to a superior in London, cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text,
which made Barings management structure geographic and not matrix.
74. Gapper, supra note 73, at 2.
75. See, e.g., GENERAL AccouNrING OFRcE, No. GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVA-
TIvEs: AcTIoNs NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYsTEm 24 (1994); Lee Berton, Under-
standing the Complex World of Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at C1. For
example, the value of an option contract is based on the difference between the asset
price and the exercise price. To the buyer of a call option (someone who buys the right
to purchase an asset in the future at an "exercise price"), the option is worth the differ-
ence between the asset's market value and the exercise price.
76. The General Accounting Office used this definition of derivative products in a
recent report to the U.S. Congress. GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFIcE, supra note 75, at 26.
Depending on one's precise definition of "derivative," the GAO definition might be over-
or under-inclusive.
77. SATGAJIT DAs, SwAps AND FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 46 (2d ed. 1994).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 39. See also GEERA ACCouNTING OMCE, supra note 75, at 28.
80. DAs, supra note 77, at 44. See also GENE AL ACCOUNTING OFICE, supra note 75,
at 26.
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with the exchange setting the date and time of the contract's
performance.8s
Leeson purchased futures on SIMEX and the Osaka Stock Exchange.
82
His fateful transactions were to buy the Nikkei 225 Index and sell Japanese
government debt (respectively, to write puts and calls).83 Leeson later
started writing straddles.8 4 A straddle is the simultaneous writing of a put
and a call. 85 If the price of the underlying asset goes up, the buyer of the
call will exercise its option; if the price of the underlying asset goes down,
the buyer of the put will exercise its option. The party selling the straddle
can only make money if the price of the underlying asset remains relatively
stable.8 6 Between January 1, 1995 and Barings' margin default on Febru-
ary 27, 1995, Leeson's futures trading losses arose from his position in the
Nikkei 225 Index and Japanese government bonds.8 7
2. Why Parties Enter Derivatives Transactions
Parties enter derivatives transactions because they are mutually benefi-
cial.88 The type of benefit each party seeks may be different. Barings
authorized Leeson to purchase certain derivatives for purely speculative
purposes (i.e., to assume risk in attempting to profit from anticipating
changes in market rates or prices). If Barings had sought to hedge previ-
ous positions rather than speculate on changes in the market, the risks to
counterparties would have been very different. This section discusses how
parties use derivatives to hedge and speculate.8 9
81. DAS, supra note 77, at 44-45. See also GENERAL ACCOUNrING OFI'cE, supra note
75, at 26-27.
82. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. For an in-depth description of the
instruments Leeson bought, see BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 15 1.37, 3.47, 4.17,
4.43.
84. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
85. GIPSON, supra note 44, at 354-55.
86. The price must remain relatively stable only if the strike price for the call
exceeds the strike price for the put. If the price does remain stable, the party that sells
the straddle can earn twice as much money as if it had purchased a put on the same
asset.
87. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, cl 4.17.
88. Cf. infra note 106 and accompanying text.
89. There are three basic reasons parties use derivatives: to hedge, to speculate, and
to obtain better financing terms. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 75, at 25.
Parties generally use derivatives to obtain better financing terms in swap transactions.
Essentially, such transactions allow parties to borrow at lower interest rates than they
could achieve in the regular market for debt. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern
Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 333, 351 (1989); DAs, supra note 77, at 12-13. Ricardo's theory of comparative
advantage explains why parties in swap transactions are able to obtain these benefits
from trade. See, e.g., DAVID RIcARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLTCA ECONOMY AND TAXA-
TION 8-10 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1963) (3d ed. 1821); PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 13-33 (1988); TODD G. BucHot.z, NEW IDEAS FROM
DEAD ECONOMISTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 66-67 (1989).
Vol. 29
1996 The Fall of Barings
a. Using Derivatives to Hedge
The use of derivatives to protect a party against market fluctuations is
called a hedge.90 For example, if Barings had a long position in the Nikkei
Index, it could buy puts to hedge its position. Without hedging, a decrease
in the Nikkei Index would destroy the value of Barings' investment. With
hedging, although a decrease in the Nikkei Index would wipe out the value
of the long position, that loss would be offset by the increase in the value of
the put. After transactions costs, Barings would wind up where it started.
But in real-world markets, hedges do not eliminate market risk.9 1 For
instance, a party purchasing a hedge typically cannot find a counterparty
willing to deliver an exact amount of the hedge asset at the precise dates
desired by the purchaser. Consequently, it has been said that "[t]he only
perfect hedge is in a Japanese garden."
92
b. Using Derivatives to Speculate
Leeson did not, in fact, purchase straddles and futures as hedges. Rather,
he was betting thatJapanese stocks would increase in price while the price
of Japanese government bonds fell.93 Had he been correct, Barings would
still be in existence today. Unfortunately for Leeson and Barings, the mar-
kets did not move in the direction he predicted. The fact that Leeson could
lose so much money reveals two aspects of derivatives that distinguish
them from more conventional assets. First, the value of a derivative can
often be more easily wiped out than the value of a conventional asset.
9 4
Second, most derivatives, including those Leeson purchased, are leveraged
(i.e., purchased with borrowed money). 95 Although leverage increases the
pay-off of a transaction that earns a higher return than the cost of financing
the leverage, it also means that, like Barings, a party may lose more than its
investment. That is why Barings had to increase its margin payments as
the value of its derivatives fell.
96
90. RICHARD A. BRiELEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PmNCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE ch.
25 (1988). Although Leeson's transactions did not help Barings obtain better financing
terms, this Note includes a description of such transactions to provide the reader with a
complete description of the range of transactions that motivate parties to use derivatives.
91. See infra Part II.C.l.a.
92. Surviving the Meltdown: Rotberg on Risk, INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 28, 1987, at 727,
cited in Hu, supra note 89, at 358. But see Lee Berton, Understanding the Complex World
of Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at C15 ("The only perfect hedge is in an
English garden") (quoting Halsey Bullen of the Financial Accounting Standards Board).
93. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
94. Unlike the value of a conventional asset (e.g., corporate stock), the value of a
derivative is directly related to the terms of the agreement between the parties. If a deriva-
tive expires at 12:00 p.m. on Tuesday, the derivative has no value at 12:01 p.m. on
Tuesday. A share of corporate stock merely represents a fixed claim whose terms are not
negotiated between the parties.
95. For example, by putting a $300 deposit on a $10,000 futures contract, a buyer
will lose $200-66% of the deposit-if the value of the contract drops just 2%, to $9,800.
See infra Part II.B.3.
96. See id.
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3. The Effect of Buying Derivatives on Margin
Leeson bought contracts9 7 on margin on Barings' behalf, the standard
practice whereby a buyer borrows money to buy a financial product.
When buying a future or option on margin, a buyer typically supplies col-
lateral, the initial margin, and then increases the margin payment if there is
an adverse movement in the price of the derivative. 98 SIMEX and the
Osaka Exchange required different margins for proprietary trades as
opposed to trades executed on behalf of a client.9 9
Buying on margin gave Barings' relatively small switching business the
chance to make huge profits on the small differences in the price of futures
contracts on SIMEX and the Osaka Exchange. The business was very prof-
itable, which may account for some or all of the reluctance of Barings' top
management to investigate the operation's flawed internal controls. In
1994, the division responsible for Barings' switching business accounted
for 17.8% of Barings' operating profits, which was a greater contribution to
operating profits than all of BIB.1 00 Nevertheless, the use of closed posi-
tions (simultaneous purchase and sales) in margin trades does not give rise
to significant risk. Leeson, however, was conducting unauthorized trades
in open positions,' 0 ' which left Barings subject to the risk of financial ruin
from significant adverse price movements.10 2 Japanese banks financed
most of BSJ's switching-related margin, 10 3 and the total value of bank loans
to BSJ exceeded £500 million by mid-February of 1995.104 In addition to
the significant funds BSJ received from third-party creditors, the total fund-
ing provided to BFS (largely to meet required margin with SIMEX)
increased from £39 million onJanuary 7, 1994, to £221 million on Decem-
ber 31, 1994, and to £742 million on February 24, 1995.105 As a practical
matter, it could be said that Barings' collapse occurred when its creditors
feared that the total margin they had provided Barings was insufficient to
meet likely losses.
97. A contract is defined differently for different products on different exchanges.
For example, a Nikkei 225 Index futures contract is 1,000 times (Y) the Nikkei 225
Index price on the Osaka Exchange but only 500 times (Y) the Nikkei 225 Index price
on SIMEX. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, app. V. For a complete description of the
futures Leeson traded, see id.
98. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 11I 3.3, 6.4. For example, if Leeson
purchased one Nikkei 225 Index contract at Y17,500, the 10% margin that the Osaka
Exchange required for members' proprietary purchases would be eliminated by a Y1,750
fall in the index.
99. See BANK oF ENGLAND, supra note 1, app. V. In the United States, margin require-
ments for most transactions involving extending credit are set forth at 15 C.F.R.
§§ 207.1 et seq, 220.1 et seq., 221.1 et seq (1995).
100. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, TI 3.51-3.52.
101. Id. 1 4.1.
102. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
103. Id. 1 6.9.
104. Id. '1 6.15, Fig. 6.2.
105. Id. 1 6.20, Fig. 6.4.
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4. Benefits of International Derivatives Transactions in a Global Economy
International financiers use derivatives for the same reason that any other
contract is used-the contracting parties believe that performance of the
contract will make them better off than they would be without making the
exchange of promises.10 6 Over the last few years the world's economies
have become increasingly interconnected. 10 7 For instance, Barings benefit-
ted from its ability to purchase large quantities of assets in two different
markets simultaneously, exploiting price differences between SIMEX and
the Osaka Stock Exchange. 10 8 Such authorized trades made by Leeson
also benefitted to members of the world community because they made
world markets more efficient. The existence of parties that take advantage
of such arbitrage opportunities provides market participants with a degree
of certainty that they are not over-paying for a product. 10 9
The benefits from such financial trades are no different from the bene-
fits arising from trade in manufactured goods or raw materials. In a free
international economy, trade results from the comparative advantage of
various market participants, 1 0 and trade makes both parties better off
than they otherwise would be. Further, a party with relatively few desira-
ble resources can be made better off through trade, as may other parties
better themselves by trading with relatively less efficient players in the
world economy. The costs of government efforts to prevent the free flow of
financial products between nations are similar to the costs imposed on
consumers when governments impose tariffs on real goods-the national
economy becomes less productive, and certain segments of the population
are left behind. Because derivatives transactions arise in an environment
where market participants use their comparative advantage to engage trad-
ers of other nations, any unilaterally-imposed government regulation that
seeks to prevent certain domestic trades also prevents domestic market par-
ticipants from benefitting from the efficiencies of trade. 1
C. Risks of Derivatives Transactions
All transactions entail risks. For example, SIMEX and the Osaka Stock
106. See generally JACK HiRSHLEiFFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 78-89 (4th ed.
1988) (describing the gains from trade generally); KRuIAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 89,
at 21-24 (describing the gains from international trade).
107. KRUGmAN & OBsrFELD, supra note 89, at 314-15. The notional value of all inter-
est rate and currency swaps increased from $1,048,504 million in 1987 to $3,506,322
million in 1992. DAs, supra note 77, at 5. Over that period, the percentage of such
swaps between U.S. parties or involving a U.S. counterparty decreased from 67.2% to
44.1%. Id. The General Accounting Office puts the total notional value of derivatives
transactions at $17,643,000 million for 1992, up from $7,198,000 million in 1989.
GENERAL ACCOUIrING OmcE, supra note 75, at 36.
108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. Cf. BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 90, at 163-64.
110. Swaps (a form of derivative, see supra Part I.B.1) extend the theory of compara-
tive advantage to the world's capital markets. DAs, supra note 77, at 13. See also Hu,
supra note 89, at 333, 351.
111. See infra Part III.B. For a description of the economic effects of a tariff, see KRuC,-
MAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 89, at 204-07.
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Exchange risked Barings' default. 112 This section describes two types of
risk inherent to derivatives transactions-risks to the immediate parties and
risks to third parties.
1. Risks to Immediate Parties
A party's determination of risk drives its decision to enter a transaction.
1 13
The importance of a particular risk is tempered by its probability of occur-
rence. 114 To the extent that a party overestimates the true risk in a transac-
tion, it will consider the cost of that transaction to be relatively high and
will engage in fewer such transactions. 1 15 Although such a miscalculation
may prevent the company from earning a profit (and may eventually
threaten its survival), a company that overestimates the risk of a transac-
tion only forgoes potentially profitable opportunities. In contrast, a party
that underestimates true risk considers the cost of the transaction to be
relatively lower than it actually is, and will engage in relatively more of
such transactions than it otherwise would. Its survival is immediately
threatened by such a miscalculation.
The important risks in a derivatives transaction are those that would
prevent the derivative from serving its purpose as a hedge, as a speculative
investment, or as a way to obtain better financing terms. There are four
types of risk that may detract from a derivative's ability to help a party
meet its objectives: market risk, legal risk, credit risk, and operations
risk.116
a. Market Risk
Market risk arises from an instrument's exposure to the possibility of
financial loss due to unfavorable movements in interest and currency rates,
or equity and commodity prices.117 For instance, Leeson thought Japa-
nese interest rates would go down, but instead they went up.118 As a
result, adverse unanticipated market movements caused Barings' loss.
The total market risk in a derivatives transaction depends largely on
the nature of the derivative. A hedge insulates the participant from market
risk. Banks that purchase derivatives products as end-users are usually
hedging against an existing risk, and, therefore, are usually reducing over-
all risk exposure.119 Leeson, however, was behaving speculatively. 120
Because his transactions left Barings with an "open" or unhedged position,
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
113. See RicuAu A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANA.Yss o I LAW § 1.1 (4th ed. 1992).
114. Id. § 1.2.
115. Id.
116. GemtAL AcCOUrIMNG OmcE, supra note 75, at 9.
117. Id. at 60. For an explanation of how institutions calculate their market risk, see
HenryJ.S. Cheever, Managing Credit Risk in Derivatives Transactions,J. CASH MGm.,July-
Aug. 1993, at 30-31.
118. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 1 4.95-.99.
119. Bank Regulators Recommend Four Changes to Derivatives Bill in House Subcommit-
tee, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 73, 74 (1994).
120. Cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Barings was left subject to the full range of market risk inherent in the
financial instruments he purchased. Any transaction that parties enter for
reasons of comparative advantage 121 (e.g., interest rate swaps) provides the
parties (e.g., the fixed- and floating-rate payors) with otherwise unobtain-
able advantages from trade, but without necessarily insulating them from
market risk. Only a hedge will protect a party from market risk
b. Legal Risk
Legal risk results from exposure to the possibility that a court, a regulatory
body, or a legislative body will invalidate a derivatives contract and cause a
financial loss. 12 2 Legal risk in derivatives transactions exists only because
a legal body has decided that, for one or more reasons, particular transac-
tions have characteristics that do not deserve legal protection. For exam-
ple, certain derivatives may be illegal gambling instruments. 123 Such a
finding rests on the basis that any transaction that meets certain formal
requirements is itself gambling and consequently illegal, even if the trans-
action had certain benefits as well. 1
24
To assess risk exposure accurately, counterparties must develop an
understanding of issues relating to the legal enforceability of derivatives
contracts. 125 The likelihood that a body will find a derivatives contract
legally invalid is relatively small in a jurisdiction with settled law and
experienced lawmakers. Of greater concern is that parties who claim to
have been harmed by a transaction will seek redress. 126 For example,
Deutsche Bank, A.G. sued Barings for entering a $49.7 million swap after
Barings knew that it was insolvent.127 Additionally, there are many legal
risks that arise in international derivatives transactions from bankruptcies,
and often a mere technical default can bring into effect legal rules that
entirely change the responsibilities of the parties.128
c. Credit Risk
Credit risk is exposure to the chance of financial loss as a result of a
counterparty's failure to meet its financial obligations. 129 Corporate finan-
121. See supra note 89.
122. GmqEAL_ AcCOUNTING OFFcIC, supra note 75, at 64.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 195-208.
124. See infra Part III.A.3.
125. Fed's Phillips Gives Update on Int'l Coordination on Derivatives Activities, 63 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) 62, 62 (1994) (quoting Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Phillips).
For convenience, this Note puts all "legal risk" arising from international derivatives
transactions into two categories: regulatory risk (see infra Part IIL.B) arising from the
fact that certain transactions may run afoul of a legal rule promulgated by a body
charged with oversight of financial transactions; and transactional risk (see infra Part
Il.A) resulting because a transaction between two parties may not be legally enforcea-
ble. Of course, either of these legal risks can be eliminated by changing or waiving a
regulation, signing a treaty, or modifying existing law.
126. See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
127. Bloomberg Business News, Deutsche Bank Suit on Barings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1995, at D5.
128. See infra Part III.A.2.
129. GNaEmL AcCOUNIMNG OFnCE, supra note 75, at 52.
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cial managers say that their greatest concern in using derivatives is credit
risk.130 Though the reasons for counterparty default vary, the primary
consideration is a party's ability to assess and plan for the risk of
default. 131 One means by which a corporate financial manager could mini-
mize credit risk is to only enter transactions with AAA-rated institu-
tions.132 While such practices do theoretically minimize credit risk, they
also severely limit the field of potential counterparties. 133 Credit risk may
be eliminated through an exchange of guaranteed cash flows; credit expo-
sure only exists when a derivatives transaction is not guaranteed. 134 In the
United States, most derivatives-related transactions conducted on
exchanges are processed by clearinghouses, which guarantee payments
between counterparties. 135 Most credit exposure on U.S. derivatives-
related transactions results from OTC trades. 136 Likewise, the credit risk
in Barings' fateful transactions turned out to be minimal because its margin
deposits apparently covered many of its losses. 137
d. Operations Risk
Exposure to the possibility of financial loss resulting from inadequate sys-
tems, management failure, faulty controls, fraud, or human error creates
operations risk.138 Barings' collapse was a classic case of operational fail-
ure. Operations risk arises from the inherent inefficiency of bureaucra-
cies. Although the Group of Thirty has identified weaknesses in derivatives
dealers' management of operations risks,139 it is not clear that those weak-
nesses are unique to derivatives trading. 140 Barings' difficulties in moni-
toring derivatives transactions were similar to the difficulties that any large
organization faces in overseeing far-flung operations.
While derivatives transactions may not present unique operations
risks, they may magnify the potential downside from such organizational
failure. For example, fraud committed in a leveraged transaction may have




134. See DAs, supra note 77, at 1141-49 (citing three swap practices that reduce credit
risk: netting exposures, collateralization, and insurance); Cheever, supra note 117, at
32.
135. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, supra note 75, at 56. The exchanges where such
trades take place require parties to pose margin to limit the risk to the exchange when
clearing the trade. See, e.g., 12 C.F.1L § 220.4 (1996) (requiring posting of margin for
banks, broker-dealers, and others, respectively).
136. GENERAL AcCOUTING OFrrce, supra note 75, at 56.
137. Cf. supra note 60.
138. GENRAL ACCOUtiNG OFFice, supra note 75, at 66.
139. Id.; GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRAMCES AND PINCIPI.as 50 (1993). The
Group of Thirty is an international financial policy organization whose members
include representatives of central banks, international banks and securities firms, and
academia. GENERA ACCOUIMNG OrmcE, supra note 75, at 36 n.5.
140. But see GRouP OF THIRTY, supra note 139, at 50 (arguing that complexity of deriv-
atives transactions merits special focus on involvement of senior management, docu-
mentation, independent risk-management functions, and independent internal audits).
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a greater potential downside than fraud committed in the conduct of an
organization's day-to-day activities. Additionally, an adverse market can
wipe out the entire value of many derivatives, unlike conventional assets.
Operations risk posed by.derivatives transactions is of even greater con-
cem to banking regulators than is the establishment of adequate capital
standards.
141
Finally, derivatives transactions may create unique operations
risks. 142 Even for a sophisticated financial institution, a system of internal
controls and oversight mechanisms that would be adequate for non-deriva-
tives transactions may not suffice to control the many complex facets of
derivatives transactions. New people, new training, and new systems might
be needed to manage the risks inherent to such transactions.
2. Risks to Third Parties
Although a contract presumptively benefits both parties, 143 performance of
a derivatives contract may create external costs ultimately borne by third
parties who did not agree to take on any of the risks of the exchange. 144
There are two instances where international derivatives transactions may
create such externalities. First, a single institution could conceivably bor-
row on margin to finance the purchase of derivatives of sufficiently great
cost to threaten the liquidity of the international financial system. In the
early stages of Barings' insolvency, there was some concern that its failure
could threaten other institutions.145 Ultimately, the Bank of England's
decision not to save Barings reflected its belief that dosing the bank would
not threaten the health of the British or international financial systems, or
cause heavy losses for small depositors. 146 British regulators decided not
to risk public money when there was no reason to fear a panic.147 Second,
a party may be found to be without legal capacity to enter into derivatives
transactions, 148 forcing other parties to unknowingly assume the risks of
141. Hold Off on Derivatives Lawfor Now, Administration Working Group Recommends,
63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 113, 114 (1994).
142. Brandon Becker, Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Division
of Market Regulation, said that effective management controls have become a "unifying
theme of the regulatory response to derivatives." Becker Calls Management Controls
"Unifying Theme" in Derivatives Response, Banking Daily (BNA), Sept. 26, 1994, at 1.
143. The notion of mutually beneficial exchange is fundamental to understanding
why parties create agreements (contracts). See I-hRSHLEFwIR., supra note 106.
144. For a discussion of the imposition of such costs on third parties in other set-
tings, see, e.g., HiRSHLEIFER, supra note 106, at 472-74; Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 4-6 (1960).
145. Stevenson, supra note 15.
146. Paul Lewis, The Collapse of Barings: The Decision; Acceptable Failure not Seen as a
Threat to Financial Systems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at D8.
147. Id. Once a liquidity risk does arise, the response of central bankers becomes
paramount. If central bankers do not provide enough funds in the face of such a panic,
a severe contraction may result. See MILTON FREMmAN & ANNAJ. ScwARTz, A MoNEARY
HISTORY OF THE UNTED STATES: 1867-1960, at 339-41 (1963) (describing the U.S. econ-
omy's reaction to the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policies following the crash of
1929).
148. See infra text accompanying notes 189-94.
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the transaction.
Some U.S. regulators have said that banks and thrifts should not
engage in speculative149 activities with insured deposits, but that hedging is
different 150 because it does not present a risk to government-insured
deposits. Instead, hedging eliminates some of the risk that insured depos-
its would otherwise face. Deposit insurance is a classic "moral hazard"
that encourages bank managers to risk depositors' money in a way they
would not be likely to do in the absence of such insurance. 151 Depositors
at an uninsured bank have an incentive to oversee the bank's lending prac-
tices that is not shared by depositors at insured banks. The government
pays for the cost of any improvident lending practices. Conversely, the
owners of an insured bank will be relatively aggressive in the pursuit of
new business opportunities because the potential benefits to the banks
from high-risk lending strategies outweigh the potential downside.
III. Analysis
This Part evaluates the extent to which current efforts to oversee derivatives
transactions help the parties to such contracts allocate risks of the type
involved in the collapse of Barings.
A. Transactional Law
By transactional law, this Note refers to the positive law that governs rela-
tions between parties, including matters regarding enforceability of con-
tract terms,' 5 2 the application of a particular sovereign's law to a
contract,15 3 and rules of decision governing how a law applies to a particu-
lar set of facts.' 54 Every day, international travellers cash travellers checks,
obtain foreign exchange, and make credit card purchases" 55 with little or
no interference from government officials. An American in Rome might
use an American Express card to pay for a hotel room, certain that the
hotel will accept her card. The hotel is equally confident of securing pay-
ment from American Express.
This degree of certainty does not exist to the same extent in the world
of derivatives transactions. Parties are not so sure of what they are buying,
149. See supra Part II.B.2.b. for a discussion of Leeson's speculative use of derivatives.
150. Bank Regulators Recommend Four Changes to Derivatives Bill in House Subcommit-
tee, supra note 119.
151. See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 113, § 15.9, at 448; JoNATHAN R. MAcEY & GEoFREY
P. MILLER, BAIING LAW AND REGULATION 265 (1992).
152. For example, many swaps contain a limited two-way payment provision that
allows a non-defaulting party to abandon its obligation. There is some question as to
whether such terms constitute unjust enrichment.
153. For example, many swaps purport to apply the law of New York State. See infra
note 163 and accompanying text.
154. For example, England prohibits municipalities from speculating with swaps on
public policy grounds. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
155. Cf. P.B. Faircrest, Connected Lenders and the Conflict of Laws, 130 NEw LJ. 698,
699 (1980) (discussing international credit card transactions under United Kingdom
law).
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and lawyers are not yet sure how different nations' courts will enforce the
terms of different derivatives contracts. In the United States, Gibson Greet-
ings recently sued Bankers Trust Co. for allegedly causing them to enter
into "improper" derivatives transactions.' 56 In contrast to such well publi-
cized actions challenging the enforceability of complex instruments,
Leeson's unauthorized trades were relatively straightforward and did not
implicate issues of enforceability. Currently existing rules of transactional
law adequately address the types of trades involved in Barings' failure.
This Section discusses the effect of three areas of transactional law on
derivatives transactions: choice of law, bankruptcy, and gambling and
public policy. 15 7
1. Choice of law
In theory, choice of law questions arise whenever people in a derivatives
transaction are located in different jurisdictions.15 8 Choice of law in a dis-
pute concerning a derivatives contract turns on whether the parties
selected the law of a particular sovereign to govern their transaction.1-5 9
Courts will generally apply the law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern their rights and duties, 160 but will apply standard choice of law
rules in determining which law should apply to the terms of a particular
contract.1 1 In the absence of an effective selection, U.S. courts typically
156. Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Sued on Derivatives, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at
Cl; Bankers Trust Responds to Gibson Suit, Says Card Firm Knew Risks of Derivatives, 63
Banking Rep. (BNA) 562, 562 (1994). Gibson Greetings eventually settled out of court
for an undisclosed sum. Steven Lipin, Gibson Greetings Reaches Accord in Suit Against
Bankers Trust Over Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at A2.
157. The Statute of Frauds has also proven to be an issue in derivatives trading,
requiring that agreements to be performed more than a year after execution be evidenced
by a writing. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-701 (McKinney 1989); Statute of
Frauds, 1677, 29 Chas. 2, ch. 2, § 4 (Eng.). Under Singapore law, the English version of
1677 controls. See GRoUP OF TmwTy, DERvATvEs: PRAcrICE AND PRINcIPLES app. II, at
281-82 (1993). Because Leeson's SIMEX futures trades were to be performed within one
year after execution, the Statute of Frauds was inapplicable. Cf. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra
note 1, app. V. New York has even amended its Statute of Frauds to exclude certain
derivatives. See N.Y. GEN. OBtaG. LAw §5-701(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997) ("An agree-
ment, promise, undertaking... is not void for lack of a... writing ... provided that
such agreement, promise, undertaking or contract is a qualified financial contract").
158. Although no reported case has decided the issue with respect to enforceability of
a choice of law provision in a derivatives contract, the choice of law questions that arise
in any international contract dispute are comparable. See, e.g., Bank Itek N.V. v.J. Henry
Schroeder Bank & Trust, 612 F. Supp. 134, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New York law
when the parties in an international transaction "clearly expressed their intention that
the law of New York control the interpretation and enforcement of their contract");
Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Est., 593 F. Supp. 928, 940 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that
California law applied to agreement with a California choice of law provision).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CorNucr OF LAws § 186 (1971) ("Issues in contract
are chosen by the law chosen by the parties"). Under the original Restatement, parties
did not have any power to choose the applicable law. Id. at 558.
160. Id. § 187. See, e.g., Milanovich v. Costa Cociere, S.p.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Bank Itek, 612 F. Supp. at 141.
161. John Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A
Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflicts of Laws 30, 42
(1972) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Cornell University).
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apply the law of the sovereign with the most significant relationship to the
transaction.1 6 2 Derivatives contracts such as the standard form for OTC
swap transactions contain choice of law provisions that allow the parties to
choose whether New York or English law governs the agreement.
1 63
Assuming, arguendo, that the parties to a sophisticated derivatives
transaction will always make an explicit choice of law selection in their
agreement,1 64 there still could arise a number of different instances where
one party has reason to argue that an explicit contractual provision should
not apply.1 6 5 This was the argument presented by Deutsche Bank, which
tried to rescind a swap transaction with Barings by arguing that, since Bar-
ings was insolvent when they entered the swap, the transaction was
void. 16 6 Such an argument would seem even more likely to apply in an
international transaction where a sovereign might have a particularly
strong interest in protecting certain policies.1 6 7 For instance, a choice of
law clause in a derivatives contract would not apply to a void or voidable
162. RESTATEMENT (SacoND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 188 (1971). See, e.g., Trinh v.
Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1176 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Vietnamese law in a suit
by depositors to recover deposits lost when the bank's Saigon office closed before the
city fell to the North Vietnamese). Although older law focused on the location of the
contract, the freedom of commercial parties to choose the law governing their contract is
supported by authorities going back at least two centuries. PETER NORTH, PluvATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAw JURISDICTIONS 104 (1993) (pointing out that
party autonomy can be traced to the sixteenth century French jurist, Dumoulin).
163. International Swap Dealers Association, Schedule to the Master Agreement, § 4(h)
(1992), reprinted in Ian Wallace, Legal and Documentation Issues of Swaps and Financial
Derivatives, in DAS, supra note 77, at 1385. Denis M. Forster, a partner at Baker &
McKenzie, says that a majority of swaps are under contracts that elect to apply New York
law. Cuomo Signs Bill Closing Legal Loophole in Derivatives, Foreign Exchange Trades, 63
Banking Rep. (BNA) 157, 157 (1994).
164. For the law when such a selection is not made, see supra note 162 and accompa-
nying text.
165. Under the Restatements approach, even the law of the state chosen by the par-
ties does not apply if the particular issue could not have been resolved by a particular
provision in the agreement and the law of the state chosen by the parties does not have
a:
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or . . . application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the par-
ticular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CoNnc-r OF LAws § 187(2) (1971).
166. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
167. For example, the United Kingdom does not allow municipalities to enter into
swaps to speculate. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text. The interest in
preventing borough councils from entering into certain contracts would outweigh
another jurisdiction's claim to enforcement.
Where a party lacks legal capacity to contract, the incapacitated party does not legally
enter into a contract, and there is no choice of law provision for a court to enforce. See,
e.g., ARTHUR LINTON CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 227 (1963) (pointing out that, at
common law, contracts of an infant are voidable). In such a circumstance, a court will
likely apply the law of the sovereign with a significant relationship to the transaction.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. As an officer of BSL, Leeson was an agent
who had apparent authority to bind the bank RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 7
(1984). His transactions were prima facie enforceable under agency theory.
Vol. 29
1996 The Fall of Barings
contract,16 8 or if the clause itself was sufficiently offensive to a materially-
interested sovereign to render the choice of law selection void.169
2. Bankruptcy
In international bankruptcy, a sovereign has strong incentives to apply its
own law to resolve the affairs of a bankrupt party.170 As a result, an inter-
national bankruptcy arising from the actions of rogue traders such as
Leeson can create havoc for scores of creditors, both governmental and
private sector, seeking to recover their investments. Nations often claim
plenary power over assets located within their borders. 171 Some commen-
tators have referred to such an exercise of power as "territoriality.' 172 A
jurisdiction's insistence on applying principles of territoriality to adjudi-
cate creditors' claims in international bankruptcy protects the debtor's
assets from foreign claims and protects domestic creditors against foreign
creditors. 173 Commentators have criticized the territoriality principle for
contravening the principle of creditor equality and encouraging a race to
the courthouse. 174 Barings' transfer of funds for margin calls 175 could
have led to a mad scramble for Barings' cash in England, Japan, and Singa-
pore. Whether a foreign creditor may recover the payments that are due
under a contract 176 is determined by applying the bankruptcy law of the
sovereign with authority over the assets of the bankrupt.' 77 For example,
under Japanese bankruptcy law, "[a] bankruptcy adjudged in a foreign
country shall not be effective with respect to properties existing in
Japan."178 Japanese law thus provides Japanese courts with exclusive judi-
cial authority to determine creditors' rights to the property of a bankrupt
168. A contract would be void or voidable when it violates the public policy of a
significantly interested sovereign, as in Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Bor-
ough Council, [1992] 2 L.R.A.C. at 1.
169. A court might refuse to apply a choice of law clause when a bankrupt
counterparty seeks protection under its sovereign's insolvency laws. See infra Part
llI.A.2. In such a case, the court has a strong incentive to disregard the contract's
provisions.
170. See, e.g., John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 634-36 (1980).
171. Jay L. Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflict of Laws Issues in International
Insolvencies, in Cuiumrr DEvEoPmErrs IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
INsOLvENcY LAW 655, 655-56 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) (arguing that a principle of
recognizing foreign interests, or the "universality" of creditors claims, should develop).
172. Id.
173. Honsberger, supra note 170, at 634-35.
174. Id. at 635. See also Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 171, at 656-57. West-
brook & Trautman believe thatJapanese law represents an extreme version of territorial-
ity. Id. at 655 n.2.
175. See infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
176. Over many transactions, the likelihood that a party will become insolvent bears
some relation to its credit risk. See supra Part II.C.1.c. After insolvency occurs, however,
the creditor's goal is to minimize the loss resulting from the other party's default. Of
course, the likelihood of default is influenced by the penalties associated therewith.
177. See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 171, at 55-57; Yasuhei Taniguchi, Inter-
national Bankruptcy and Japanese Law, 23 STAN. J. IN'L L. 449, 451-52 (1987).
178. Taniguchi, supra note 177, at 451.
Cornell International Law Journal
party located in Japan. In contrast, U.S. law, particularly with respect to
swap transactions, seeks to ensure the equal distribution of assets among
creditors. 1 79
3. Illegality
Governments could certainly outlaw all derivatives transactions. But while
this would likely have prevented Barings from engaging in any harmful
international derivatives transactions, it also would have prevented scores
of other companies from realizing the benefits that derivatives afford.1 80
Such an approach would limit the freedom of parties to contract and,
because no country would be willing to say that every international deriva-
tives transaction is illegal, promote uncertainty by raising the possibility
that any particular transaction falls under the terms of a prohibition.'8 1
Although international derivatives often involve relatively sophisti-
cated transactions,1 8 2 two issues resolve their legality: first, whether the
substantive law of illegality of a particular state applies to the terms of a
particular contract;'8 3 and second, whether the derivatives are actually ille-
gal under that nation's law. This section focuses on this second issue. In
Barings' case, there was little possibility that the derivatives were illegal
per-se. The laws of Singapore' 8 4 and England' 8 5 make explicit provision
for the legal trading of certain derivatives. Leeson's futures are explicitly
included in the list of financial instruments authorized for trading under
the laws of both these countries.
179. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(3)(17) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1996) ("the filing of a
[bankruptcy] petition... does not operate as a stay... of the setoff by a swap partici-
pant, of any material debt amd claim"); see Scot Tucker, Note, Interest Rate Swaps and the
1990 Amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code: A Measure of Certainty Within
Swap Market Contracts, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 581, 582.
180. See supra Part II.B. for these benefits.
181. The reader may ask why opportunities to argue whether any international deriva-
tives transaction falls under a statutory prohibition do not exist. While such opportuni-
ties do exist, the incentives for lawyers to make such arguments are relatively small in
free societies that ordinarily allow a wide range of commercial transactions. In a closed
society (such as one that would ban all international derivatives transactions), a party
faces a large windfall if it is given the right to engage in an otherwise prohibited activity.
In such a society, lobbying and other attempts to acquire exclusive legal rights (i.e., rent-
seeking) would be pervasive. See generally JAmEs BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMO-
cRA-nc PROCESS 67 (1967) (arguing that political actors develop policy separately from
direct oversight of taxpayers); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMr. ScI. 1 (Spring 1971), reprinted in CHICAGO STUDIES IN PotrCAl. ECON-
omy 209, 209 (George Stigler ed., 1989).
182. Robert Citron, the former treasurer of Orange County, California, has blamed $2
billion in derivatives trading losses on his "inexperience." Sarah Lubman & John R.
Emshwiller, Before the Fall: Hubris and Ambition in Orange County, WAI.L ST. J., Jan. 18,
1995, at Al.
183. This is a question of international choice of law. See supra Part IlI.A.1. For
example, P(1), a resident of C(1), alleges that the option she sold to P(2), a resident of
C(2), was an illegal gambling instrument under the laws of C(3), a country whose laws
were expressly supposed to apply to the terms of the option contract. Will a court in
C(2) grant P(1)s request for a declaratory judgment stating that the contract is void?
184. Futures Trading Act, 1985, ch. 116, § 3 (Sing.).
185. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 1 & 3, sched. 7-9 (Eng.).
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By way of contrast, the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA)
Master Agreement allows an essentially non-prejudicial termination of an
agreement, 186 or allows the party for whom the transaction has become
illegal to transfer the obligation to an unaffiliated subsidiary without incur-
ring a technical default.18 7 But the ISDA's protection mechanism might
not always offer protection to counterparties. 188 For example, in 1987 and
1988, a town council in England entered into a number of swap transac-
tions to both speculate1 8 9 and hedge1 90 on the movement of market inter-
est rates. 19 1 The council was held to have legal capacity to enter into
contracts "calculated to facilitate the discharge of the local authority's func-
tion of borrowing."19 2 The court held that the swaps transactions were
beyond the scope of the authority granted to the town council by stat-
ute. 19 3 Further, the court held that swaps were so far beyond the powers
authorized by statute that a council could not even enter into swaps to
minimize previously acquired exposure to interest rate fluctuations.
194
In addition to the possibility that a court will hold that a counterparty
lacks the necessary legal capacity to enter into a derivatives contract, the
nature of derivatives transactions themselves subjects the contracts to the
possibility of falling under certain nations' prohibitions against gambling.
For example, certain derivatives may be illegal gambling contracts under
the laws of Brazil, a civil law jurisdiction that has dealt with the gambling
issue very differently than the common law jurisdictions of the United
States and England.195 Under Brazil's Civil Code, wagering contracts are
unenforceable, 19 6 and contracts of sale in which settlement is either based
on some difference between an agreed-upon price and a market price,
197
or in which the parties have no real intent to deliver any merchandise, 198
186. International Swap Dealers Association, Master Agreement (1992), reproduced in
Ian Wallace, Legal and Documentation Issues of Swaps and Financial Derivatives, in DAS,
supra note 77, § 6(b)(iv), at 1369.
187. Id. § 6(b)(ii), at 1368.
188. A court could refuse to enforce transfer provisions such as those contained in
the ISDA Master Agreement, see supra note 186, but such an occurrence only raises
choice of law issues, such as those discussed supra Part II.A.1.
189. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
190. See supra Part ILB.2.a.
191. Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, [1990] 2 Q.B.
697, 708-09.
192. Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2
L.RAC. at 1.
193. Id. at 37.
194. Id. There are several other instances where certain organizations lack the capac-
ity to enter derivatives transactions. Australia prohibits building societies and credit
unions from entering into certain derivatives transactions, and England grants only lim-
ited authority to building societies to enter swaps. Wallace, supra note 163, at 1353-54.
195. GENERAL AccouUrrNG OFFICE, supra note 75, at 65.
196. C6digo Civil [C.C.] §§ 1477-79 (Braz.); GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 157, app. II,
at 72.
197. This would be the case in a swap transaction. See supra text accompanying note
79.
198. This would be the case with a futures contract. See GENERAL AccOuImNG OFFCE,
supra note 75, at 26.
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are considered wagering contracts. 199 Despite the language of such provi-
sions, the Central Bank of Brazil has expressly authorized the Brazilian
private sector to engage in swaps, caps, floors, and collars to hedge against
international market risk.20 0 As a result of the Central Bank's action, there
is a category of international derivatives transactions that are outside the
reach of the Civil Code's prohibitions.20 1 All transactions that do not fall
within the Central Bank's exceptions continue to be illegal.
In contrast to Brazil, England has explicitly exempted a list of deriva-
tive financial instruments from the application of its gambling statute.
20 2
Investments excluded from application of gambling laws include options,
futures, and "any other contract the purpose or pretended purpose of
which is to secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in the
value or price of property of any description or in an index or other factor
designated for that purpose in the contract."20 3 As a result, the Financial
Services Act provides an exemption from application of English gambling
laws to international derivatives transactions entered into by approved
investors.
2 04
In the United States, there is yet a third approach to avoiding the char-
acterization of derivatives as gambling instruments. Under New York law,
"[aill contracts for or on account of any money or property, or thing in
action wagered, bet or staked ... shall be void."20 5 Although option con-
tracts are not illegal gambling contracts in New York, 20 6 the New York
courts have distinguished an illegal wager from a legal investment on the
following grounds:
The difference is that the investor does something or attempts to do some-
thing to influence the favorable outcome of the venture, while the gambler
passively awaits ... the happening of a fortuitous event. The absence of a
working investment, with money passing only after the event, is one of the
indicia of an illegal wager.
20 7
Nevertheless, given this analysis it seems possible that a New York court
could find a bilateral netting arrangement in an interest rate swap to be
akin to a passive roll of the dice (a "fortuitous event") on the direction of
future interest rates.
20 8
199. GRoUP OF THIRTY supra note 157, app. II, at 72.
200. Id. at 74.
201. Id.
202. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 63 (Eng.) ("No contract to which this
section applies shall be void or unenforceable by reason of... section 18 of the Gaming
Act of 1845").
203. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, sched. 1, q'I 7-9 (Eng.).
204. Cf. Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, [1992] 2
L.R.A.C. 1, 29 (striking down a derivatives contract because of the nature of one of the
parties, not because of the nature of the transaction).
205. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-411 (McKinney 1989).
206. Story v. Salomon, 71 N.Y. 420 (1877).
207. Liss v. Manuel, 296 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
208. This question is discussed in Ronald L. Cheng, Note, Legal Doctrines Restricting
the Secondary Market in Interest Rate Swaps, 26 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 325-27
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B. Regulatory Law20 9
Typically, regulatory law does not tell parties how to undertake a transac-
tion, but instead imposes conditions on those parties that decide to under-
take certain transactions. For example, the Bank of England's requirement
that Barings report any transfer of assets with a value of more than 25% of
its capital 210 was based on regulatory law. Regulatory law is normally cre-
ated to have some effect on costs that would otherwise be borne by some-
one not a party to a particular transaction. Regulatory law that could affect
derivatives transactions includes the capital adequacy standards and
deposit insurance applicable to banks, as well as other restrictions on bank
activities and general corporate securities laws.
21 1
Laws arising from a single nation's unilateral imposition of restric-
tions on derivatives transactions either force market participants to exter-
nalize the costs of regulation or force the participants to drop out of the
market altogether. To prevent the unwanted departure of market partici-
pants engaged in activities that tend to benefit a host economy, an interna-
tional consensus that recognizes the harmful side-effects of imposing
unilateral regulation seems to be emerging. Nations are starting to cooper-
ate to create uniform legal rules of universal applicability that allow indi-
vidual nations to control the negative externalities that international
derivatives transactions may create. This Section examines unilateral and
universal regulations in banking and corporate law that apply to interna-
tional derivatives transactions.
1. Deposit Insurance and Capital Adequacy
BB&Co was a bank subject to the Bank of England's regulatory author-
ity.2 12 The Bank of England was responsible for consolidating the supervi-
sion of BB&Co, 2 13 and was the "lead regulator" of all Barings' activities
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with the Securities and
Futures Authority (SFA). 214 The SFA is a Self-Regulatory Organization
(1988). For an overview of the application of various nations' gambling laws to deriva-
tives transactions, see generally GRouP OF THIRTY, supra note 157.
209. For the purposes of this Note, regulatory law refers to the positive law that
governs relations between a party and the state.
210. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
211. In theory, government could also use the tax code to control the risk of financial
transactions in general, and of derivatives transactions in particular. For example, a
100% tax on the net benefit of an interest-rate swap would prevent such an activity from
taking place. Although government could tax those parties that put government money
at risk in order to reimburse government for incurring that risk, such tools as insurance
premiums are more efficient. To the extent that government decides to use a derivatives
tax to raise money, the transactions would be subject to the implications identified by
the Laffer Curve: at some point an increase in marginal tax rates would decrease reve-
nues. For a discussion of the Laffer Curve, see generally RUDIGER DoRNBUSCH & STANLEY
FIsCHER, MACROECONOmICS 600-01 (4th ed. 1987).
212. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 1(1) (Eng.) ("The Bank of England has... the duty
generally to supervise the institutions authorised by it . .
213. BANK oF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 'IN 12.6-12.7.
214. Id. 12.12.
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(SRO) organized under the Financial Services Act of 1987.215 SFA believed
itself to have authority only to monitor BSL's financial resources and to
protect BSL's customer assets,2 16 and was under no duty to regulate the
business of non-member subsidiaries of BSL. 2 17 But the Bank of England
had two means to constrain these risks: capital requirements and deposit
insurance.
a. Capital Requirements
Capital adequacy regulations are intended to deter banks from engaging in
activities with excessive risks.21 8 Since some of an even providently man-
aged bank's investments (e.g., loans) will fail and at least some depositors
will withdraw money at an uncertain time in the future, a bank must main-
tain at least some capital reserves to insure its liquidity.2 19 In England, the
Bank of England must approve the capital structure of "authorized"
banks. 220 In the United States, all depository institutions are subject to
capital adequacy rules based upon leverage ratios and risk-adjusted capital
guidelines. 22 ' However, recent international agreements have created
more uniform capital adequacy rules among nations.
2 22
Increasing bank capital requirements to offset the perceived risks of
derivatives transactions would merely force banks to externalize this new
cost.2 23 Increasing capital requirements would cause banks to engage in
riskier activities to earn the same return on their capital as earned by simi-
larly-situated foreign banks with lower capital requirements. Domestic
banks would be at a competitive disadvantage,2 24 and governments might
face a higher rate of bank failure. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that
an increase in Barings' capital requirements would have prevented its col-
lapse. If anything, higher capital requirements might have caused Barings
to engage in even riskier activities.
b. Deposit Insurance Premiums
Because Barings was an authorized bank,2 25 a deposit protection fund was
obligated to protect the deposits of its small creditors. 22 6 One reason for
regulators to be concerned about derivatives-related activities of banks is
that bank failures jeopardize the deposits of small creditors, who could be
wiped out by such a failure. While there are many different justifications
215. WInj-Am BLAIR E r AL., BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL SERvicEs Acr 5 1.37 (1993).
216. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, cl 12.104.
217. Id. cl 12.106.
218. MAcEY & MiLLER, supra note 151, at 284.
219. Id. at 47-49.
220. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 9(2).
221. MAcEY & Miim. , supra note 151, at 284-87. Leverage ratios compare capital to
assets, without any adjustment for risk. Id.
222. Id.
223. The cost of a higher capital requirement is effectively an increase in the bank's
cost of capital.
224. See generally Coase, supra note 144 (describing the imposition of external costs).
225. See supra note 22.
226. Cf. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 58(1), (2) (Eng.).
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for deposit insurance, commentators agree that there are persuasive rea-
sons for its use in protecting small depositors.
2 27
In England, banking institutions that accept deposits are required to
contribute to a "depositor protection fund"228 based on the value of depos-
its. The fund only protects deposits that mature in less than five years.
229
The protection extends to the first £20,000 of a depositor's funds. 30 By
contrast, the U.S. government currently insures deposits in federally-
insured institutions for up to $100,000.31
Such guarantees obviously benefit the banks232 by attracting con-
servative investors. To cover the risk of loss, the U.S. government charges
banks an insurance premium based on the probability of loss with respect
to the types and concentrations of a bank's assets and liabilities. 233 In
contrast, England charges a fixed premium regardless of the risk created by
a bank's lending practices, creating a perverse incentive for risky behavior.
Like capital standards, the unilateral imposition of deposit insurance
premiums that bear no relation to the risk of a bank's assets causes a bank
to externalize the costs of the regulatory requirement. 234 If a deposit insur-
ance premium is not risk-based, the premium will act like a tax on insured
institutions. To earn a return equivalent to the return earned by other
banks that do not pay an FDIC premium (i.e., non-U.S. banks), U.S. banks
must earn a higher pre-premium return on their assets.235 Imposing an
227. See, e.g., FRImmAN & ScuxvARTz, supra note 147, 440.
228. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 52(1) (Eng.); MARK HAPGOOD, PAGEr'S LAW OF BANK-
ING 18 (10th ed. 1989).
229. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 60(6); HAPGOOD, supra note 228, at 19.
230. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 60, § 60(1); HAPGOOD, supra note 228, at 19.
231. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). See also 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1813(m) (West Supp. 1995). The deposits are "backed by the full faith and credit of
the U.S. Government." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(a)(1)(A) (West 1989). By contrast, Canada
insures deposits up to $60,000 (Canadian), and Japan insures deposits up to Y10 mil-
lion. 2 PHILIP N. HABLUTZEL, INTERNATIONAL BANmNG LxAW § 24.11 (1994).
232. Milton Friedman believes that deposit insurance has succeeded in preventing
banking panics. Fma-DmAN & ScHwAR-z, supra note 147, at 440.
233. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 342, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). The FDIC developed regula-
tions to implement the law under 12 U.S.C. § 327 (1994), and has recently proposed
amending the premiums charged. See Assessments: Retention of Existing Assessment
Rate Schedule for SAIF Member Institutions, 60 Fed. Reg. 9266 (1995) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 327); Assessments: New Assessment Schedule for BIF Member Institutions,
60 Fed. Reg. 9270 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 327).
234. It is uncertain to what extent the FDIC's "risk-based insurance premiums" accu-
rately reflect the riskiness of a bank's assets. Under recent FDIC proposals, see supra
note 233, 90% of 11,000 banks covered by the Bank Insurance Fund would receive the
fund's highest ("safest") rating. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., F.D.I.C. Plans to Cut Fee Banks
Pay for Insurance, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at D2. If all banks were to receive the same
rating, the ratings would be of doubtful accuracy.
235. For example, a bank with an initial balance sheet of $100 of assets, $90 of debt,
$10 of equity, and no obligation to pay deposit insurance premiums must earn a return
of 10% on its assets to double shareholder's equity to $20. A bank with a similar initial
balance sheet that also pays a 33% deposit insurance premium must earn a return of
15% on its assets to provide its shareholders with the same after-premium return.
Notwithstanding the consequences of the unilateral imposition of non-risk-based
costs on FDIC-insured institutions, some believe that deposit insurance should be regu-
lated by a series of rules that ignore the risk of the underlying transactions. Representa-
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increased and non-risk-based deposit insurance premium on England's
banks would only increase risky behavior. It would not prevent a collapse
such as Barings'.
c. The Basle Accord
Leverage ratios are a crude instrument to use in setting capital adequacy
standards. 236 An alternative to requiring leverage ratios is requiring banks
to keep in reserve a percentage of capital that reflects the relative risk of the
loans in its portfolio.237 In 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Regula-
tion and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee) reached an agreement
(the Agreement) for broad-based capital adequacy standards based upon
the riskiness of a bank's assets. 238 In theory, such an approach does not
create an incentive to increase the riskiness of the loans in bank portfolios
and, in a nation that insures deposits, externalize the costs of the change in
behavior.
2 39
But the effect of leverage ratios becomes more problematic as banking
becomes a truly international activity240 and assessing the riskiness of a
bank's portfolio becomes a more difficult task. In a world where banks
from country A compete with banks from country B to lend money to firms
in country C, capital requirements do not impose any discipline upon
banks. A bank located in a country with relatively lower capital require-
tive Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) has stated that banks engaging in derivatives transactions
should be at a disadvantage because of the "special burden" of their deposit insurance.
Bank Regulators Recommend Four Changes to Derivatives Bill in House Subcommittee, supra
note 119. Schumer would require banks to set up separate subsidiaries for derivatives
trading activities. Id. But Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan disagrees,
saying that "requiring banks to confine their proprietary trading activities to separately
capitalized subsidiaries or affiliates" could increase "the risk these activities pose to the
financial system," and hurt the competitiveness of U.S. banks. Hold Off on Derivatives
Law for Now, Administration Working Group Recommends, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 113,
114 (1994). Greenspan apparently believes that Schumer's firewall would impose a cost
on bank activities that bears no relation to their risk. For a description of how the
"-proper" calculation of insurance premiums avoids creating externalities, see MACEY &
MILLER, supra note 151, at 265. In addition, no proponent of using insurance premiums
to regulate derivatives has explained why such transactions differ substantively from any
other banking activities. While it is certain that there is some bank-specific risk related
to derivatives transactions, the level of risk depends upon the extent of the market, legal,
credit, and operations risks arising from derivative transactions. See supra Part II.C.
236. See supra Part III.B.l.a.
237. See, e.g., MACEY & MILLER, supra note 152, at 285.
238. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE oF CAPITAL MEAsuRETm AND CAPITAL STANDARDS I 1, 8 (1988), reprinted
in 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) cl 47-105 [hereinafter BASLE ACCORD]. See MAcEY &
MILLER, supra note 151, at 285. The Basle Committee, which meets at the Bank for
International Settlements, is comprised of representatives from the central banks and
supervisory authorities of the Group of Ten and Luxembourg. The Group of Ten
includes Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 75, at 36 n.11.
239. In practice, it may be very difficult to assess the relative risk of different loan
portfolios.
240. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 151, at 285.
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ments has a competitive advantage over banks located in other countries.
As long as nations wish to impose some sort of capital requirement on
their banks, pressures of international competition require that nations
adopt a risk-based capital adequacy standard.
New rules concerning the imposition of risk-based capital adequacy
regulations were coordinated along with the adoption of the Agreement.
241
The Agreement sets risk weights for assets with five different categories of
risk, requiring reserves to reflect the relative riskiness of each asset cate-
gory, increasing from 20% for the safest assets to 100% for the riskiest.
242
The Agreement then requires a target ratio of capital to weighted-risk
assets of 8%.243 As a result, a bank's total asset requirements are deter-
mined by multiplying its total risk-adjusted assets by 8%.244 By adjusting
a bank's required capital to the relative risk of its assets, the Agreement
reduces a bank's incentive to engage in risky activities. The reward such a
bank would otherwise expect from engaging in higher risk activities is off-
set by the requirement that such a bank must hold a greater amount of
capital in reserve.
The Agreement resolves some of the difficulties that arise from the
unilateral regulation of banking activities by promoting the consistent
application of capital requirements across nations. The Basle Committee
cited three advantages to its risk-based approach: making comparisons
between banking systems fairer, allowing off-balance sheet activities to be
incorporated more easily into measures of capital adequacy, and not deter-
ring banks from holding low risk assets.245 For countries committed to
some form of capital adequacy requirement, the Agreement's risk-based
241. Wallace, supra note 163, at 1356.
242. Risk weights were assigned to off-balance sheet activities (including derivatives):
1. Direct credit substitutes, e.g., general guarantees of indebtedness (including
standby letters of credit serving as financial guarantees for loans and securities)
and acceptances (including endorsements with the character of acceptances)
100%[;]
2. Certain transaction-related contingent items (e.g., performance bonds, bid
bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular transac-
tions) 50%[;]
3. Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies (such as documentary
credits collateralised by the underlying shipments) 20%[;]
4. Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse, where the
credit risk remains with the bank 100%[;]
5. Forward asset purchase, forward deposits and partly-paid shares and securi-
ties, which represent commitments with certain draw-down 100%[;]
6. Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities 50%[;]
7. Other commitments (e.g., formal standby facilities and credit lines) with an
original mdturity of over one year 50%[;]
8. Similar commitments with an original maturity of up to one year, or which
can be unconditionally cancelled at any time 80%.
BASLE AccoRD, infra note 238, Annex 3.
243. Id. 50.
244. See MAcEY & MiLLER, supra note 151, at 285-87.
245. THE BASLE AccoRD, supra note 238, c 28.
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standards will change bank behavior less than a crude leverage ratio.24 6
Agreements like the Basle Accord can also help to minimize legal risk247 by
facilitating understanding between countries and by promoting equal
treatment of similar transactions in different countries.
Although the Agreement addresses several of the concerns that would
be raised if a nation unilaterally imposed its own capital requirements,
several capital adequacy and related bank safety issues remain. It has been
argued that the Agreement's capital requirements have led certain marginal
banks to withdraw from the derivatives business and have led non-bank
financial institutions (which are unaffected by the Agreement) and banks
with high credit ratings to enter the derivatives market.24 8 The Agreement
provides regulators with two alternative ways to value certain derivatives
transactions.249 One method (mark-to-market, or current exposure) allows
a bank to add the replacement cost of derivatives contracts on which it
owes money to an amount for future credit exposure based upon a small
percentage of the derivative contract's notional value.250 The second
method (original exposure) allows a bank to multiply the derivative's
notional principal amount by a conversion factor.251 At least one commen-
tator believes that the heavier weights for longer term and multi-currency
transactions have led organizations to stop entering into such transac-
tions,252 apparently reasoning that organizations would not have engaged
in fewer longer term and multi-currency transactions after implementation
of the risk-weighted standards if the weights accurately reflected the addi-
tional risk of such transactions. Alternatively, this change in behavior
could be explained by arguing that implementation of the risk-adjusted
derivatives' weights removed a subsidy that derivatives-trading banks previ-
ously enjoyed. Longer-term and multi-currency transactions do involve
more risk than transactions that do not contain either or both of these
elements. The change in bank behavior that Das observed after implemen-
tation of the Agreement's capital adequacy guidelines for interest rate and
foreign currency transactions could merely reflect the rules having their
intended effect. 2 53
246. Compared to a leverage ratio, which contains no "penalty" for acquiring a risky
obligation, a risk-based standard imposes a burden on banks that is theoretically equal
to the increased risk of loss associated with the risky obligation. See supra Part III.B. .a.
Of course, this holds true only to the extent that the risk weights corresponding to the
asset categories reflect the actuarial risk associated with the assets that comprise the
category.
247. For a discussion of "legal risk," see supra Part II.C.l.b.
248. DAs, supra note 77, at 1181-82.
249. The Basle Accord specifies criteria for determining the value of "foreign




252. DAs, supra note 77, at 1181.
253. Ceterus paribus, risk of default increases over time. Long-term transactions
should be more heavily weighted than short-term transactions. Likewise, in a transaction
involving only a bank's domestic currency, there is no currency risk. Introduction of a
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Although the Agreement's provisions may tend to make a bank more
risk averse than it would be with the requirement of a pure leverage ratio, it
does not seem that any sort of broad-based capital requirement could serve
to stifle the determined efforts of a rogue trader. But the Agreement's
inability to prevent the actions of another Leeson need not be seen as a
drawback; the Agreement does serve to limit the risk exposure of a well-
managed bank. Barings failed because of its managerial imperfections.
Thus, to the extent that the management of a properly-managed bank can
keep the bank in compliance with the Agreement, the bank will be better
able to protect government's contingent liability from the type of default
that Barings' managers allowed to occur.
2. Activities Restrictions on Banks
In both England and the United States, banks are regulated entities. The
following describes various aspects of this regulation as well as how these
regulations affected Barings.
a. Asset Transfers
Given Barings' collapse, it is neither clear that banks undertaking deriva-
tives transactions impose costs on third parties, nor that governmental
oversight is likely to prevent unauthorized escapades such as Leeson's.
England's banking law does require a parent company to notify the Bank of
England if the parent transfers an amount greater than 25% of its capital to
a subsidiary. 254 It is likely that Barings' margin payments to SIMEX and
the Osaka Stock Exchange exceeded 25% of its capital, and that Barings
violated English law by failing to notify the Bank of England.255
The English statute requiring governmental oversight of parent corpo-
rations risking a significant portion of their assets did not stop Leeson
from engaging in unauthorized activities. Given the existence of a report-
ing requirement that would prevent Barings from engaging in overly risky
endeavors, it might seem that lax governmental oversight was one cause of
Barings' failure.256 On the other hand, increased vigilance by regulators
would only shift responsibility for proper managerial oversight of the firm
to government, which has less incentive than the corporation itself to man-
age the corporation's affairs effectively. After all, the Barings family paid a
high price-the loss of their firm-for its inability to control the actions of
its company's employees. 257 Further, regulatory reporting requirements,
such as that of the Banking Act of 1987, do nothing to improve the manage-
ment of a corporation's activities. The division of oversight responsibilities
foreign currency into a transaction, therefore, necessarily introduces the risk of currency
depreciation that did not previously exist.
254. See BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 1I 12.10-12.11.
255. John Gapper et al., Clarke Rejects Calls for Independent Inquiry-Leeson to Contest
Extradition, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 4/5, 1995, at 1.
256. See John Gapper, The Barings Crisis: Tough Questions for Supervisors-Bank of
England, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 4/5, 1995, at 2.
257. See supra note 61.
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for Leeson's activities was a managerially dubious proposition. 258 It splin-
tered authority to the point where no one person was responsible for cer-
tain vital activities, such as ensuring that Leeson was performing his job in
accordance with applicable rules. When third parties are not at risk, there
is no reason for the government to concern itself with such oversight.
In contrast to English law, which creates a regulatory reporting
requirement, U.S. law creates no affirmative corporate duty to inform regu-
lators of permissible activities in which bank holding company subsidiar-
ies engage. Instead, U.S. law prohibits transfers from a parent to a
subsidiary when such transfers exceed 20% of the capital stock of the
member bank.2 59 Unlike the Bank of England's reporting requirement, the
Federal Reserve Board relies on its examinations of bank holding compa-
nies to determine the scope of a holding company's activities.260 If the
Board determines either through its examinations or other means that cer-
tain practices pose a "serious risk" to sound banking practices, the Board
can require the holding company to stop such activities after notice and an
opportunity for hearing.26
1
The affirmative reporting requirement of the 1987 Banking Act would
not have prevented Barings from intentionally engaging in unsafe practices.
If Leeson's managers were simply incompetent, the Banking Act's reporting
requirement did not serve its purpose. Although U.S. law largely relies on
government bank examiners to identify unsafe practices, it also relies on
the vigilance and timeliness of examiners to prevent bank employees from
engaging in unsafe practices; there is no guarantee that an examiner will
come along just as a Nick Leeson is about to gamble billions of a U.S.
bank's money. Additionally, the U.S. law's black-letter proscription of cer-
tain transfers26 2 may provide a bank's management with a rule that is eas-
ier to enforce than England's, which allows for regulatory approval.
England's law requires management to establish a procedure for the bank
to seek regulatory approval in certain circumstances. 263 U.S. law merely
requires management to enforce an outright ban.26 4 And certain legal
rules may be more effective at promoting sound management practices
than others.2 65 In the end, strong and effective bank management is the
best way for banks to stop employees from engaging in unauthorized
activities.
b. Other Restricted Activities
Although Barings was subject to the Bank of England's regulatory author-
258. Cf. supra note 73 and accompanying text.
259. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(a)(1)(B) (West 1989).
260. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c) (West 1989).
261. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(e) (West 1989).
262. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(a) (West 1989).
263. Cf. BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 1, 'I 12.10-.12.
264. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(a) (West 1989).
265. A single, clearly stated goal is more easily monitored than many vaguely defined
goals. CtLuA, supra note 64, § 16.2 (citing Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is To Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 33).
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ity,26 6 there were no per-se restrictions on the sort of proprietary futures
trading activities that led to Barings' collapse. Certain of Barings' subsidi-
aries' activities were subject to SFA's regulatory authority (i.e., were not
subject to the Bank of England's regulatory authority). 267 In contrast, in
the United States there are restrictions on the activities of banks and bank
affiliates. 268 Preventing banks and affiliates from engaging in derivatives
transactions would not have prevented Barings' collapse. If anything, such
restrictions would have caused Barings to engage in even riskier activities
in the search for a return that would allow it to compete with its unbur-
dened competitors.
3. Securities Law and Other Disclosure Requirements
Futures are securities under the laws of the United States,269 England,
270
and Singapore.271 All three nations regulate securities transactions by
requiring disclosure of information that could affect a well-informed
party's decision to enter a transaction with an issuer.272 Disclosure
requirements are intended to provide a corporation's creditors with infor-
mation important in evaluating the company. In addition to national dis-
closure systems which may give rise to the problems associated with
unilateral regulation, the International Institute of Finance's (11F) Global
Information Framework (the Framework) is an example of universal disclo-
sure regulation.
a. National Disclosure Requirements
National disclosure requirements fall into two categories. First is the famil-
iar system of periodic disclosure, which provides shareholders with infor-
mation about a corporation's activities. In England, companies with public
shares must prepare an annual report that includes certain statutorily
required disclosures. 273 In Singapore, certain companies must similarly
266. See supra note 22.
267. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text
268. National banks may exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994). An activity is "necessary to
carry on the business of banking" if it is "convenient or useful in connection with the
performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its express powers
under the National Bank Act." Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir.
1972). Bank holding companies, i.e., companies that own banks per 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1) (1994), may only engage in activities "so closely related to banking or man-
aging or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1994). Finally, the Glass Steagall Act prohibits national banks from underwriting, sell-
ing, or dealing in securities, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994), and prohibits banks from affiliating
with firms that are "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale,
or distribution ... of stocks ... or other securities." 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1994).
270. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 7-9 (Eng.).
271. Securities Industry Act, 1986, ch. 289, § 2 (Sing.).
272. An alternative would be to regulate the substance of each company's
transactions.
273. Companies Act, 1948, § 124(1) (Eng.).
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file annual reports.274 Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of
1934,275 publicly-held companies must disclose certain information by fil-
ing periodic reports with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
2 76
Currently, however, there is no legal requirement (outside of general
financial statement disclosures) 277 for publicly-held companies in the
United States, England, or Singapore to disclose derivatives transactions in
particular.278 In the United States, there are currently several proposals
that would require certain disclosures of derivatives-related activity.
279
For example, the SEC is considering a new rule concerning mark-to-market
accounting for derivatives.280 This rule would require corporations to post
"losses" due to derivatives transactions on their books when an adverse
change in the market affects the value of a derivatives contract. In theory,
such rules would help investors to value derivatives holdings at any point
in time but would not help investors to value derivatives over the longer-
term.281 Meanwhile, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
has implemented many different plans to require certain disclosures relat-
ing to financial instruments in annual reports.282
274. Companies Act, 1990, ch. 50, §§ 197-98 (Sing.).
275. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
276. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 now generally imposes reporting require-
ments on publicly-owned firms with 500 or more shareholders or $5,000,000 or more in
total assets. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); Louis Loss &JOEL SEUG.
MAN, FUNAMETrALS OF SEcuRmEs REGULATION 419-21 (3rd. ed. 1995).
277. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
278. But see infra note 282.
279. For a discussion of the possible consequences of these proposals, see infra notes
285-89 and accompanying text.
280. See Proposed Amendment to Require Disclosure of Accounting Policies for
Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclo-
sure of Qualitative and Quantitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Deriva-
tive Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity
Instruments, 61 Fed. Reg. 578 (1996); Abby R. Schultz and Jeffrey Taylor, SEC May
Change Accounting Rules for Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at A4.
281. The rule would not apply to swap contracts the institution can prove are being
used as a hedge. Schultz & Taylor, supra note 281. The SEC is also considering man-
dating disclosure of equity swaps. Warren Getler, Equity Swaps Now Require SEC Filing,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1994, at C1. Equity swaps are, as the name implies, swaps of
equity securities by corporate insiders with large holdings, the sale of whose stock
would require disclosure. Cf. id. Typically, equity swaps take place when an investor,
with a large holding, swaps that holding (and retains voting rights) in return for the
income stream from an agreed-upon diversified portfolio. Id.
282. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDs BoARD, Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 105: Disclosure of Information About Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-
Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk, 1 ORIGINAL PRO.
NOUNC EmENTS 1245-72 (June 1994) (requiring all entities to disclose information about
financial investments with off-balance-sheet risk); FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 107: Disclosures About Fair Value
of Financial Instruments, supra, at 1392-1408 (requiring all entities to disclose fair mar-
ket value of investments when practicable). For an argument that greater disclosure in
annual reports is not a good idea, see RayJ. Groves, Here's the Annual Report. Got a Few
Hours?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at A12; Bronwen Maddox, What Value Greater Disclo-
sure?, FIN. TIMEs, August 29, 1994, at 20:
Inclusion of more data in a bank's trading statements could even be misleading,
in that creditors, investors and counterparties may be tempted to overlook other
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The disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and the
Companies Act are largely backward-looking 28 3 and do not significantly
help investors assess a publicly-owned corporation's future prospects.
28 4
Disclosure requirements relating to derivatives transactions could contrib-
ute to the market's ability to value a firm's assets to the extent that such
disclosure requirements reflect future risks and the likelihood of future
payoffs. 285 Mandating disclosure is only appropriate when market partici-
pants cannot effectively obtain such information on their own,2 8 6 and dis-
closure is nevertheless least likely when it is adverse to a company's
interests. 28 7 For example, proposed regulations in the United States
requiring mark-to-market accounting288 are only useful to the extent they
could reflect a firm's ability to meet future obligations. These mark-to-mar-
ket accounting rules represent information that could help investors value
derivatives transactions undertaken by a firm.28 9 In effect, they would
lower the risk of investing in a company that engaged in international
derivatives transactions. While mark-to-market accounting rules could not
prevent the activities of rogue traders like Leeson, they could help to
inform investors of their investment's potential exposure if corporate man-
agement proves itself incompetent.
Second, laws in England and Singapore do impose certain record-
keeping requirements on futures dealers. In England, futures dealers must
prepare financial statements that reflect their position.290 Singapore's rec-
ord-keeping requirement imposes. a duty on futures dealers to accurately
report their futures contract activity to the government, 291 but this require-
ment only imposes liability on Barings for Leeson's activities after-the-
risks. As Salomon puts it, "the market's current derivatives obsession will dis-
tract attention from potentially riskier activity" such as banks' renewed taste for
developing countries' debt and for highly leveraged deals.
283. Cf. Donald C. Langevort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 747, 778-81 (1985).
284. The value of a security depends upon the future prospects of the firm issuing
them. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 90, at 49-52 (describing why the value
of a firm equals the value of expected future dividend payments plus the expected future
company growth).
285. There are two qualifications to this potential for disclosure of derivatives activity
to benefit firms engaging in such transactions. First, it assumes zero or de minimis
compliance costs. Second, it assumes the transactions are somehow speculative. Disclo-
sure of the existence of a hedge is only beneficial to the extent the market cannot ade-
quately value an unhedged transaction.
286. Langevort, supra note 284, at 781.
287. Id. at 785. For an argument that firms will also disclose bad news to preserve a
reputation for candor, which helps in raising capital, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Mandating Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 683
(1984).
288. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
290. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 221 et seq. (Eng.). See JOHN C. WHrra, REGULA-
nON OF SEcuRnES AND FUTuREs DEALING 358 (1992).
291. Futures Trading Act, 1985, ch. 116, § 25(I)(a) (Sing.) (requiring futures dealers
to keep records that "will sufficiently... reflect the financial position of the business of
trading in futures contracts carried on by [the dealer]").
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fact. 292 Obviously, Singapore's record-keeping requirement was not suffi-
cient to stop Leeson from hiding his trades.
In the United States, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) regulates exchange-traded futures contracts.293 The CFTC
requires the reporting of open positions of a certain size.294 At least one
commentator has argued that the CFTC's reporting requirement would
have prevented Leeson from perpetrating his fraud in the United States.295
Markets are capable of assessing whether a firm's level of derivatives
trading activity is so high as to give rise to an unnecessary risk of rogue
trading. Under these circumstances, there is no justification for increased
regulation of derivatives, because creditors would account for the risk of a
Barings-like collapse by demanding higher returns.
b. The Global Information Framework
Regulation does not by itself resolve the risks inherent in oversight of com-
plicated financial transactions. Regulators and market participants cannot
fully grasp the implications of derivatives transactions without first gaining
a deeper understanding of the market itself. To this end, the IIF developed
a framework for public disclosure of derivatives-related activities. 296 This
framework has two goals: "the development of a meaningful international
industry standard for public disclosure of derivatives-related credit expo-
sures and activity levels in a firm's annual reports... [and] to contribute to
the global public policy debate concerning derivatives-related transparency
issues."297 Like any disclosure requirements, the framework recommends
the use of specific forms for reporting qualitative and quantitative informa-
tion.298 The IIF believes that its framework will improve the quality and
quantity of information available for use in the risk management process,
allay concerns about certain derivatives-related activities, and contribute to
informed policy-making. 299 To the extent that a non-mandatory disclosure
regime is capable of realizing these objectives, the framework can facilitate
future oversight of international derivatives transactions.
The IIF framework establishes guidelines for the substance and form
of derivatives-related reporting. The recommended substantive disclosures
292. A broker who fails to keep records as required by the Futures Trading Act is
subject to imprisonment of one year and a fine not exceeding $10,000. Futures Trading
Act, 1985, ch. 116, § 25(6) (Sing.).
293. See generally Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106
Stat. 3590.
294. 17 C.F.R. § 15.00(b) (1996).
295. Bair, supra note 71, at 5.
296. INsrTUT OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., A PRELIMINARY FRAMEwoRK FOR PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF DERIVATrVES AcivrrFS AND RELATED CREDrr EXPOSURES 1 (Aug. 1994).
297. INs-rrrE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., supra note 297, at 1. See also Detailed
Proposals for New Global Information Framework, Sept. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Banking Directory.
298. INSTrrrUE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., supra note 297, at 14-18. For a report-
ing example, see id. at 49-68.
299. Cf. id. at 1.
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involve quantitative and qualitative information.300 Quantitative disclo-
sures include credit exposure 30 1 and activity levels.30 2 Qualitative disclo-
sures include discussion of accounting practices, netting policies,
management's understanding of risk, and key sectors of derivatives-related
activity. 30 3 The framework's formal reporting requirements provide a
methodology for incorporating representation of derivatives-related activity
into annual reports.304 Although the framework does not carry the force of
law, it does provide prima facie evidence that organizations involved in
derivatives-related trading activities have considered the different pieces of
information that knowledgeable people require to evaluate derivatives-
related activities. Furthermore, in common law jurisdictions the failure of
members of professional organizations to follow standards promulgated by
those organizations can lead to a presumption of negligence.30 5
One could imagine a situation where an investor in a corporation
brought suit30 6 against a corporation that failed to disclose its position in
derivatives-related transactions according to the IIF framework's standards.
The investor would argue that the framework established the reasonable
standard for disclosing derivatives-related activity, that the corporation's
failure to follow the framework prevented the investor from learning of cer-
tain money-losing activities in which the corporation was engaged, and
that the corporation's failure to disclose harmed the investor.30 7 Would
the investor's recovery in such a suit promote better derivatives reporting
practices? While it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the relative
merits of imposing common law duties on allegedly negligent parties, the
benefits of any increased disclosure resulting from the imposition of such a
duty should certainly be weighed against the possible chilling effect that
such a duty could have on the future promulgation of reporting standards.
Courts should be aware that using the framework as the basis for a corpo-
rate duty to disclose derivatives-related activity could serve to prevent cor-
porations from developing any disclosure framework in the future. The
absence of a disclosure framework would prevent the dissemination of
information and the concomitant increased understanding that disclosure
300. Id. at 39.
301. Id. Credit exposure includes counterparties' credit ratings, Basle Accord credit
categories, and replacement values. Id. at 3940.
302. Activity levels are aggregated by product type (e.g., interest rate products, foreign
exchange products), notional amount, maturity structure (i.e., term), and market value.
Id. at 40.
303. Id. at 39.
304. See id. at 49-68.
305. Cf. Hawkins v. King Cty., 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a
lawyer who complied with the state's lawyer-promulgated ethics rules did not have a
duty to warn third parties that his client might be dangerous). In civil law jurisdictions,
the legal question is whether certain conduct justifies imposition of liability. Cf. Hessel
E. Yntema, The Law of Obligations, in CVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 71-75 (Athanas-
sios N. Yianopoulos ed., 1965).
306. See CLARK, supra note 64, § 15.
307. See, e.g., RESTATEMrNT (SEco~N) OF ToRTs §§ 281-82 (1965) (describing elements
of negligence).
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is designed to foster.30 8
IV. Lessons
The great lesson to be learned from Barings' well-publicized collapse is that
the world's international financial markets prevented the imposition of
costs on third parties. Barings' collapse was notable not for the holes that
it exposed in the system of regulatory oversight, but for the inability of
Barings' managers to discover the fraud in time to save their jobs. This
Section discusses why the fraud occurred, as well as who was hurt by Bar-
ings' subsequent collapse.
A. Preventing Fraud and Incompetence
The likelihood of preventing fraud is proportional to the competence and
expertise of managers and regulators as well as the size of the fraud. One
explanation of Barings' collapse is managerial-the incompetence of Bar-
ings' managers allowed the collapse to take place.
Nick Leeson caused Barings' collapse by making certain trades that
exposed Barings to excessive risk. For whatever reason, his superiors
allowed those trades to take place. Barings did not have the necessary
internal controls in place to allow responsible oversight of Leeson's activi-
ties. He allegedly transferred 60,000 futures contracts worth $5.6 billion to
an account that executives in London did not know existed.309 That
account showed a loss of £827 million as of February 27, 1995.310
Given Barings' managerial structure, it should come as no surprise to
learn that Leeson was able to hide his activities from his managers. A more
interesting question is whether the apparent ease with which Leeson con-
cealed his activities is an appropriate cause for concern. There were no
costs imposed on third parties, and Leeson's unauthorized $29 billion in
trades did not threaten the stability of the world's financial system.
Whether a rogue trader could cause a firm to take a sufficiently large stake
in the world's financial markets to threaten worldwide liquidity is debata-
ble. It would be difficult for a firm to amass a sufficiently large position
before discovery by the world's regulators and financial markets. The
308. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
309. Richard V. Stevenson, Fraud Inquiry on Barings in Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1995, at 33, 45. Singapore also issued a criminal complaint alleging Leeson forged a
confirmation that an $81 million payment had been made to Barings. Stevenson, supra
note 3. The complaint alleged that Leeson "had forged the signature of Richard Hogan,
a managing director of Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, a specialist firm that makes a market in
stocks on the New York and American Stock Exchanges." Richard W. Stevenson, Public
Relations Enters Barings Case, N.Y. Timas, Mar. 8, 1995, at D2. The complaint alleged
that documents in Mr. Leeson's office suggested that he had been practicing Richard
Hogan's signature and that "the forged letter from Spear, Leeds stated that the firm had
executed a call option on the Nikkei index of 225 Japanese stocks and [would] pay
Barings Y7.8 billion, or about $80 million." Id. "The complaint also said Mr. Leeson
had forged a document purporting to be a confirmation by Citibank that Baring Futures
in Singapore had been credited with the money." Id.
310. Stevenson, supra note 1.
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response of the world's financial markets to Barings' collapse is evidence
that a rogue trader could not, without assistance, amass a large enough
position to threaten worldwide liquidity. This is not to say that a large
institution could not enter into trades that would (unlike Barings) wreak
havoc on the world's financial markets. And the problem of large traders
maintaining oversight of their employees continues to present managerial
challenges. But Barings' collapse indicates that current procedures are suf-
ficient to prevent the use of derivatives from leading to certain types of
catastrophe.
B. Identifying the Parties Hurt by Barings' Collapse
Barings' collapse did not harm third parties because Leeson did not risk
enough money to undermine the security of the international financial sys-
tem.311 There is ample evidence that Barings' regulators and even its own
managers knew or could have known of Leeson's activities before Barings
became insolvent on February 24, 1995:312 traders in Asian markets had
known at least since early February that Barings had taken a large position
on the direction of Japanese stock prices313 and executives at Barings knew
something of the firm's exposure at least two weeks before Barings' col-
lapse.314 On February 8, 1995, Barings' officials told officials from SIMEX
that Barings was aware of Leeson's trades and that Barings had sufficient
money to cover them.315 In addition, Barings continued to meet its margin
calls from SIMEX and the Osaka exchange throughout February,
316 sug-
gesting that Barings' officials responsible for approving payment of the
margin calls knew of the magnitude of the transactions entered into by
Leeson. Further, Barings borrowed some of the $890 million (including
$200 million in the week of February 17-24 alone) needed to meet its mar-
gin calls.3 17 SIMEX's increasing margin calls throughout February is evi-
dence that it also knew of the magnitude of Barings' position. However,
Singapore's Financial Minister, Richard Hu, has said that Barings led
SIMEX to believe that Barings' open positions were for arbitrage trading
purposes, which are less risky than pure speculation.
318
Leeson's trades were not prevented because, in the big scheme of
things, they were so small. Notwithstanding bureaucratic inefficiencies, it
is implausible, perhaps impossible, for one person to engage in a sufficient
number of trades to cause harm to innocent third parties without existing
regulatory systems identifying such transactions before they are allowed to
be executed. Who was actually hurt? Certainly, Leeson's managers were
311. See supra Part II.C.2.
312. Stevenson, supra note 3.
313. Stevenson, supra note 15.
314. Stevenson, supra note 47.
315. Id.
316. Edward A. Gargan, Singapore Defends Itself Over Barings, N.Y TnvaS, Mar. 2,
1995, at DI, D6.
317. Stevenson, supra note 47. There are some reports that Barings borrowed in the
belief that Leeson was buying and selling on behalf of clients. Stevenson, supra note 3.
318. Gargan, supra note 316.
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hurt. The incompetence of Barings' managers cost many their jobs and
cost the Barings' family control of a once-proud merchant bank. This was
a fitting result as there were many banks in 1995 that executed similar
trades without making Barings' mistakes. The market rewarded good man-
agers and punished bad ones.
Conclusion
In regulating economic transactions, governments should create legal rules
only to reduce transaction costs or mitigate negative externalitites. Deriva-
tives transactions have developed to help international investors engage in
mutually beneficial trades. The laws regulating the type of transaction that
led to Barings' insolvency gave Barings and its creditors the chance to real-
ize significant potential gain. Derivatives transactions provide great bene-
fits by increasing the efficiency of the world's financial markets and by
providing investors with tools to hedge against some of the uncertainties
that arise in a truly global economy. The laws that regulate such transac-
tions allocate risk and, although imperfect, are of some utility to market
participants.
Barings collapsed largely from the failure of its management to moni-
tor its own activities, and only resulted in harm to Barings itself and to
some of its creditors. Although existing legal rules cannot prevent a rogue
trader from bankrupting an ineffectively managed employer, existing legal
rules do help prevent losses to creditors who bear some of the risk from
such trading activities. Barings' failure represents the imposition of market
discipline on a firm that did not operate in accordance with practices likely
to promote long run success.
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